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ABSTRACT 
Popular opinion expresses fear that accessing radical Islamic content and connecting with 
extremist networks through Internet functionalities causes radicalization and recruitment 
to commit terrorist acts. Anecdotal evidence has been used to support this assertion. The 
opinion assumes the Internet creates a new path that drives radicalization and 
recruitment. Whether computer-mediated communication (CMC) and Internet 
functionalities cause individuals to radicalize has not been thoroughly studied. This thesis 
explores whether a correlation can be found to attribute radicalization to radicalizing 
content and extremist networks accessed through CMC and Internet functionalities. A 
framework is used to evaluate vulnerabilities identified by the psychological, sociological 
and social-psychological elements of radicalization against the radicalization process, 
personal history, and the presence of radicalizing conventional communication and 
extremist contact. The analysis finds three cases that may support a conclusion that 
Internet radicalization is possible; however, the importance of root causes and individual 
vulnerabilities may have a greater impact. Since some circumstances involving CMC 
may increase the likelihood of radicalization, the fear of Internet radicalization may be 
reasonable, but the number of incidents validating that fear makes the threat unlikely, and 
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A long, long time ago in a distant cave where modern Internet technology allowed 
jihadists to communicate persuasive calls to embrace the dark side and fight opposing 
worldviews with violence, Abu Musa al-Zawahiri constructed a strategy to leverage 
computer-mediated communication to radicalize and recruit the umma for war against 
non-Muslims, apostates and unfaithful Muslims.1  The ubiquity of the modern Internet 
has made global connectivity and the polished production and unfiltered delivery of 
extremist information a source of concern that individuals encountering extremist 
material and networks will radicalize and join the violent jihad. This thesis examines 
whether Internet radicalization is an actual threat to homeland security, or if it is merely a 
phantom menace cloaking the real drivers of radicalization and recruitment. 
This thesis reviews current opinions about the fear of Internet radicalization, the 
causes and processes of radicalization, and creates a framework to evaluate cases that 
were considered as examples of Internet radicalization and recruitment. Analysis through 
the framework determines that of nine cases examined—only three have a significant 
correlation between radicalization and computer-mediated communication. Root causes 
and individual vulnerabilities play a substantial role in all nine cases and in several of 
sixteen additional cases summarized in the Appendix. Therefore, attention to root causes 
and vulnerabilities may be more productive than addressing the perilous area of 
intervening in Internet content and communication. The final section identifies 
recommendations for study and research to better understand the dynamics between 
radicalization and computer-mediated communication.  
 
                                                 
1 Marc Lynch, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies,” The National Interest, no. 83 (2006): 50–56.   
 2
B. INTERNET PLUS RADICALIZATION ASSUMES “INTERNET 
RADICALIZATION” 
Radical Islamic extremists publish documents, music and videos through the 
Internet to deliver extremist ideology and religious doctrine to populations beyond the 
group’s direct physical contact. Direct communication via email, video conferencing and 
social media close the physical gap between the extremists and distant targets. Internet 
connectivity creates a new “smaller world” or virtual community where actual physical 
proximity between radicalizer and recruit may no longer be necessary. A radical cleric in 
an overseas mosque, recruiting and cultivating terrorists, can now build relationships with 
United States residents, influencing not only their ideology, but also directing their 
conduct.2  Anwar al-Awlaki, who was in Yemen, reportedly had email contact with 
Major Nidal Hasan prior to Hasan murdering thirteen people at Fort Hood, Texas.3  Al-
Awlaki’s influence is said to have contributed to Hasan’s actions.4  Al-Awlaki’s 
influence and inspiration from afar is also evidenced by the radicalization of Zachary 
Chesser, who pleaded guilty to federal charges associated with terrorist activity.5  
Chesser engaged al-Awlaki in dialogue and created his own Internet presence to 
communicate Islamic extremism.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 116.  
3 Brian Ross and Rhonda Schwartz, “Major Hasan’s E-Mail: ‘I Can’t Wait to Join You’ in Afterlife,” 
abcnews.go.com, November 19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-hasans-mail-wait-join-
afterlife/story?id=9130339#.T28z6XjnsfM. 
4 Mariano Castillo, “American-born Radical Cleric Understood the West,” September 30, 2011, 
cnn.com, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-30/middleeast/world_meast_yemen-al-awlaki-profile_1_anwar-
al-awlaki-qaeda-key-al?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST. 
5 Sen. Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov. Affairs., Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online 
Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism, Washington D.C.: 
February 2012. 
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The perceived threat of Internet published radicalizing propaganda has been 
presented in Congressional hearings6, academic publications7 and news reports.8 The 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism recognizes the impact of radicalization and 
identifies the importance of taking action against al-Qaeda radicalization and 
recruitment.9  There is a knowledge gap in understanding the actual impact of 
radicalization efforts utilizing computer-mediated communication such as Internet 
websites, email, blogs and social networking applications. President Obama’s Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in 
the United States identifies this gap, and calls for research and analysis to understand the 
“role of the Internet in radicalization to violence.”10   
The opinion that the Internet presents a significant radicalization threat appears to 
be based on an assumption that radicalization results from the increased availability and 
easy access to extremist information tailored to persuade the viewer to embrace the “dark 
side.”11  To support their position, advocates usually provide anecdotes about individuals 
who have engaged in terrorist activity and were known to use the Internet to view 
material containing radical ideology, terrorist training and instruction, or participate in 
social networking sites where people engage in radical discourse. The anecdotes provide 
a logical association between the Internet and radicalization and terrorist action, but the 
logical link is weak because it assumes, rather than examines, the existence of causation.  
Causation logic requires affirmatively stating, “but-for” the individual’s encounter 
with Internet-accessible material, the individual would not have been radicalized or 
                                                 
6 Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. (March 16, 2011) (statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
7 Tim Stevens and Peter R. Neumann, “Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action,” 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, January 2009, 
http://icsr.info/news/attachments/1236768445ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf.  
8 Gordon Lubold, “Internet Aids Terrorist Recruiting, Pentagon Says,” Christian Science Monitor, 
March 10, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0310/Internet-aids-terrorist-recruiting-
radicalization-Pentagon-says. 
9 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Washington, DC: June 2011, 9–10. 
10 The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States, Washington, DC: December 2011, 13. 
11 “Dark side” is a euphemism used to describe a group with ideology that is outside the mainstream 
point of view and perceived as evil. The term was used in the “Star Wars” movie series to denote the evil 
ideology that the warriors for the good ideology sought to overthrow.   
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engaged in a terrorist atrocity. Internet causation should not be assumed without studying 
radicalization causes and processes, and determining the role computer-mediated 
communication may play to generate, magnify, or accelerate radicalization and terrorist 
conduct. Causation cannot simply be attributed because it is a feasible conclusion. In 
other words, unless the dynamics between radicalization and the role the Internet plays in 
the radicalization process is better understood, an assertion that Internet radicalization 
exists cannot be assumed.  
The problem space of this thesis is discovering a method to attribute radicalization 
to computer-mediated communication that is better than mere recitation of anecdotal 
evidence. Psychological, social and political studies have been made to analyze the 
radicalization process.12 The understanding gained from such studies assists in 
identifying vulnerabilities where individuals are most susceptible to Internet-facilitated 
propaganda and virtual social contact with extremists. A supportable causation argument 
can be developed when information discloses that computer-mediated communication 
played a substantial part in catalyzing a radical change from a conventional worldview to 
an extremist worldview. A valid causation argument will support the contention that 
Internet radicalization is a real threat, and will assist in determining proper 
countermeasures to reduce the threat. Understanding the actual nature of the Internet 
threat would also enable policy makers to adjust any national policy distortions and focus 
counterterrorism resources where most appropriate. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Does content provided through computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) create a distinct threat of radicalization, referred to as Internet radicalization? 
2. Can a framework be constructed to evaluate whether computer-mediated 
communication played a substantial role in radicalization? 
 
                                                 
12 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An 
Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process (FDD Press, Washington, DC, April 2009). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON 
RADICALIZATION, RECRUITMENT AND TERRORISM  
The Internet has made it easier to find people and create global networks among 
like-minded individuals, and it has “lowered the threshold for engaging in ‘risky’ or 
‘embarrassing’ behaviour because users can interact anonymously.”13  Terrorists use 
Internet functionalities as a tool for radicalization, recruitment, propaganda distribution, 
communication and training.14  Inspiring potential operatives through Internet 
propaganda implements Al Qaeda’s combat strategy to use the media as a battlefield.15   
Al Qaeda members Anwar Al-Awlaki and Samir Kahn have used the Internet to 
influence and motivate people to violent jihad through their electronic magazine Inspire, 
extensive Internet presence, and personal email correspondence to followers.16  The 
impact of Islamic radicalization of United States citizens through the Internet has been 
discussed in news articles and papers.17  In a hearing before the House Judicial 
Committee, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller recognized the increasing use of the Internet 
to spread extremist propaganda and the unlimited access people like Al-Awlaki gain from 
the global Internet.18    
In May 2006, Dr. Bruce Hoffman testified before the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, acknowledged the technical sophistication of Al Qaeda and 
recognized that the new media tools created by the Internet have evolved the art of 
                                                 
13 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet,” Policy Planners 
Network, Working paper of the PPN, June 2011, 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/StockholmPPN2011_BackgroundPaper_FOR%20WEBSITE.pdf. 
14 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Use of the Internet:  
Information Operations in Cyberspace, by Catherine A. Theohary and John Rollins, CRS Report R41674 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, March 8, 2011), 2. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Times Topics: Anwar Al-Awlaki, NYTimes.com, last modified July 18, 2012, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar_al_awlaki/index.html. 
17 Lubold, “Internet Aids Terrorist Recruiting.” 
18 Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. (March 16, 2011) (statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
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terrorist communication “to a point where the terrorists themselves can now control the 
entire production process: determining the content, context and medium over which their 
message is projected; and towards precisely the audience (or multiple audiences) they 
seek to reach.”19 This new expertise enables terrorists to present persuasive 
communications for fundraising, recruitment, training and instruction, operational 
planning, and propaganda and inspiration.20 The ability to construct well-designed 
messages and distribute them throughout the world via the Internet gives terrorists and 
extremists global communication capabilities to engage and influence recipients far more 
effectively than in the past. CMC provides the terrorists tools to engage in a top-down 
strategy to influence would-be jihadists.  
Dr. Hoffman again reviewed the impact of the Internet on terrorism in May 2011 
during a House of Representatives subcommittee hearing on Internet terror recruitment 
when he cited the Internet playing a common role in radicalization and terrorist plots of 
New York subway bomb plotter Najibullah Zazi; Major Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan; 
Little Rock, Arkansas, recruitment station shooter Carlos Bledsoe; and the Minnesota 
Somali youths seeking to join jihad in Somalia.21 In the same Congressional 
subcommittee hearing Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor of the RAND Corporation, 
identified the power of the Internet stating, “Many homegrown terrorists begin their  
journey to violent jihad on the internet. It is accessible to seekers, reinforcing and 
channeling their anger, it creates on-line communities of like-minded extremists, it 
facilitates clandestine communications.”22   
After finding a spike in terrorist activity in 2009, Jenkins points out the dramatic 
increase of jihadist websites and chat rooms, and attributes the Internet as a key factor in 
                                                 
19 The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists, Before the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 110th Cong. (May 4, 2006) (Testimony Bruce Hoffman), 
RAND Testimony Series (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation: 2006) 1, 
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf.  
20 Ibid., 6. 
21 Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address An Evolving Tool While 
Protecting Free Speech? Before the Subcom. on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment, 111th Cong. (May 26, 2010) Serial No. 111–67 (Statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman): 10. 
22 Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address An Evolving Tool While 
Protecting Free Speech? (Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins), 15. 
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the terrorism spike.23  He states, “…would-be jihadists can readily find resonance and 
reinforcement of their own complaints, as well as other jihadists who are only too eager 
to encourage and focus their anger.”24  In both his Congressional statement and a 
subsequent study, Jenkins does not specifically mention radicalization of vulnerable 
individuals, but acknowledges Internet functionalities enhance networking for 
discontented individuals. It is not clear whether he implies CMC enables and encourages 
already radicalized individuals to terrorism recruitment—or progresses vulnerable 
individuals from mere discontent to radical extremism. This distinction is significant in 
that the former characterizes the Internet as an efficient means for connecting the 
radicalized into a functioning network and the latter characterizes CMC as inspiring a 
person to radicalize. The connectivity and network created by the Internet applies to both, 
but the content becomes more significant in radicalization. 
Information to incite discontented people may be easily found on global 
television, radio and print news sources. The same information in a small group 
environment has been found to be critical to the process of conversion to radicalism.25  
The criticality comes from the tone of the group interaction set by the communicated 
message.26  The unique global social network functionality of the Internet may facilitate 
group formation analogous to the small group radicalization and deliver the tone-setting 
message. The Internet facilitates group formation and message delivery, but 
characterizing this function as “Internet radicalization” may overstate the nexus between 
the message delivery and the impact of the message and group dynamic. As pointed out 




                                                 
23 Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the 
United States Since September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation: 2010) viii, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf. 
24 Jenkins, “Would-Be Warriors,” viii.  
25 Frank Hairgrove and Douglass M. McLeod, “Circles Drawing Toward High Risk Activism:  The 
Use of Usroh and Halaqa in Islamist Radical Movements,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008): 406. 
26 Ibid. 
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existed before the advent of the personal computer. Groups worked together using written 
text, telephone, and television technologies to create gathering point.”27 Hence, the 
attribution of unique power may be overstated.  
As recognized experts, Jenkins and Hoffman carry significant weight in asserting 
the Internet significantly influences vulnerable recipients to radicalize or commit terrorist 
acts. Internet functionalities enabling polished media productions and advanced 
communication systems, with extensive distribution ability, project an image of a 
sophisticated, all-reaching threat able to radicalize and recruit around the globe. This 
perception appears logical, but the power of Internet functionalities may not be as 
effective as commonly understood. The new Internet apparatus for distributing refined 
extremist content may be impressive, but the reception may be no more effective than 
traditional methods for passing on the same messages.  
An Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) paper entitled, “Radicalisation: The 
Role of the Internet” identifies a concern that the Internet allows people to self-radicalize 
and act as lone-wolf terrorists.28  The paper found the Internet can intensify and 
accelerate radicalization, but comes short of explicitly stating the Internet material causes 
radicalization.29  The easy ability to confirm existing beliefs with Internet-provided 
videos and images is cited as “powerful sparks” to accelerate and intensify 
radicalization.30  Interestingly, the paper finds less evidence about the role of the Internet 
in recruiting violent activity.31   On this point, the paper presents the importance of 
offline contacts and real-world relationships in the radicalization process.32   Studies 
                                                 
27 John A. McArthur, “Mediated Group Development,” in Interpersonal Relations and Social Patterns 
in Communication Technologies: Discourse Norms, Language Structures and Cultural Variables, ed. Jung-
ran Park and Eileen Abels (Vancouver, IG Global: 2010) 294, doi: 10.4018/978-1-61520-827-2.ch016. 
28 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet,” 2. 
29 Ibid., 3. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet,” 3. 
32 Ibid. 
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regarding the impact of social networks on individual conduct and group association, 
particularly the work of Marc Sageman, are cited to support this point.33   
The ISD paper illustrates the common incoherent picture of the Internet threat. 
The homeland security threat of Internet radicalization is not whether a person accepts 
extremist beliefs presented, but whether terrorist violence results in or is caused by the 
radicalization attributed to Internet-published extremist content. In this report, a person 
accessing the Internet for extremist-created content and committing an act of terrorism 
results in an implication that evidence exists to claim the former causes the latter. Despite 
stating the Internet material “sparks,” “accelerates” and “intensifies,” radicalization, the 
assumption presented is that radicalization has occurred, radicalization more likely than 
not would not have occurred but for the impact of the Internet content, radicalization 
caused the violence, and therefore the violent activity is most likely caused by accessing 
the objectionable Internet content. The causes of radicalization are highly debated and not 
settled;34 therefore, attributing the communication medium as a cause of radicalization 
may not be rational, but merely convenient. Is the threat the Internet, the people behind 
the Internet content, or ultimately the terrorist conduct? The threat must be defined in 
terms of an individual’s action rather than the method the individual uses to access 
material to justify, inspire or instruct a particular worldview. The “threat of Internet 
radicalization” combines mechanisms of communication, radicalization and feared 
terrorist conduct.  
Akil N. Awan of the University of London questions whether actual Internet 
radicalization occurs. He acknowledges that jihadist groups know and desire to exploit 
the radicalizing potential of the Internet.35   However, Awan identifies that actual 
radicalization is difficult to ascertain, and finds that much of the material is propaganda 
aimed at indoctrination. He characterizes jihadist group efforts as a recruitment drive 
                                                 
33 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Radicalisation: The Role of the Internet,” 3. 
34 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe II:  The Potential Contribution 
of Socio-psychological and Psychological Approaches (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International 
Studies: March 2008), http://www.diis.dk/sw49735.asp.  
35 Akil N. Awan, “Radicalization on the Internet? The Virtual Propagation of Jihadist Media and its 
Effects,” RUSI Journal 152, no. 3 (2007): 78. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/212131640?accountid=12702. 
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through Internet propaganda rather than radicalization.36  Despite distinguishing 
recruitment from radicalization, Awan identifies the 2004 Madrid train bombings as an 
example of radicalization through Internet recruitment. He cites the Internet call for 
bombing trains in Spain to compel withdrawal from Iraq as evidence of this.37  In further 
examples, Awan points out that jihadist groups used the Internet as an information tool 
and for training material, but the illustrations show no clear link to the radicalization 
process other than access to information. Awan recognizes this problem. He describes a 
Canadian “home-grown” bomb plot discovered through monitoring an Internet chat room 
and states, “Yet even in such cases, where the use of Internet communication appears as 
prima facie evidence of its role in radicalization, in fact the Internet only seems to have 
provided the initial impetus:  the plot quickly became more conventional in terms of 
planning and actualization after the group meetings at a ‘training camp’ in Northern 
Ontario.”38   His example shows recruitment for violent action rather than facilitating the 
radicalization process. The illustration seems to blur the question of whether the threat is 
Internet recruitment or Internet radicalization.  
Despite citing the fact that the terrorist actors or radicalized individuals utilize 
Internet communications, the literature reviewed so far has not found a clear assertion of 
cause and effect where the Internet contact or communication is the cause of the 
radicalization or terrorist action. Maura Conway and Lisa McInerney have studied jihadi-
promoting YouTube videos to seek evidence supporting the potential for online 
radicalization.39  The study found one particular individual who “went from browsing a 
generic website to suddenly being integrated into a specific network by virtue of a single 
posted comment.”40  Conway and McInerney did not claim with certainty that the 
individual was being radicalized, but claim the study gives evidence that there is 
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“potential for online radicalization of those with no apparent prior links to jihadists.”41  
Conway and McInerney acknowledged the conflict between Bruce Hoffman’s top-down 
hierarchical terrorist organization theory and Marc Sageman’s bottom-up network theory 
and posed that Hoffman’s view may account for online extremists targeting youths 
without prior interest in jihad and Sageman for youthful seekers consuming jihadist 
materials online.42  
Sageman found that joining the jihad is a process of deciding to go somewhere for 
training, and then being formally recruited by other jihadis and finally joining the jihad.43  
Joining the jihad was found to be a bottom-up process rather than a top-down process 
where the new individual is recruited to join.44   He further found that his study subjects 
experienced an “intensification of religious feelings and conversion to Salafi Islam took 
place in a strong social context.”45   If the existence of relationships significantly impacts 
joining jihad, then a question to be explored is whether an individual accessing 
radicalizing material on the Internet can truly be radicalized to the point of violent jihad 
absent direct contact with a jihadi community to intensify faith, belief and personal 
learning. Internet radicalization in regard to self-radicalization and lone-wolf terrorism 
becomes suspect. The global social links created by the Internet may have greater and 
more significant impact than the radicalizing content, thus changing the perception of the 
term Internet radicalization from the threat of radicalizing content to the threat of 
radicalizing contacts. 
Sageman found global jihadists linked to each other through a complex web of 
direct or mediated exchanges. Virtual networks created by Internet social applications are 
analogous.46  In reconciling the lack of direct social bonds in the global jihad, Sageman 
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identified virtual bonds based on an abstraction—such as God and the umma—such that 
the global jihadist became a member of an imagined or virtual sectarian community.47  
Support for this contention can be found in a study on CMC impact on relational 
communication—communication for individuals in close relationships and interpersonal 
communication (communication among individuals connected by a similar topic or 
subject)—supports this and finds that CMC establishes an arena where people can be 
drawn together by affinity based on common interest rather than relationship.48  This idea 
is a key to the possible effectiveness of the Internet to radicalize.  
The abstract bonds, developed in the global jihad virtual community Sageman 
describes, form despite the lack of direct physical connection. Similarly, the web-surfer 
may develop a virtual community not connected to his actual life role, existence or social 
network, but develop an independent virtual social existence that fills the social bonds 
and intensification needed for radicalization.49  The avatar becomes reality when the 
web-surfer acts pursuant to the leading, direction or fulfillment of the virtual social role.50  
The functionalities of the Internet facilitate broad network development where 
globalization may be the actual driving force to radicalization. Causation may come not 
from the tool, but from access to global dynamics that in the past would be unknown, 
delayed in reception, or insignificant due to topical ignorance.  
From the literature examined, an assumption appears to be made that the new 
direct access to refined and tailored extremist information, and the enhanced ability to 
contact the global radical-extremist community, significantly facilitates either the process 
of radicalization, the success of recruitment or the ability to execute a terrorist plan. 
Radicalization seems to be attributed to the Internet due to the dynamics of the real-time 
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global communication network and objectionable content conveyed through the network. 
The Internet radicalization threat is not clearly articulated as coming from recruitment, 
radicalization or violent actions of radicalized individuals, but covered as a broad but 
paradoxically specific categorization of radicalization.  
B. RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION 
This thesis focuses on Internet radicalization and distinguishes radicalization from 
recruitment, but will reflect the context of “Internet radicalization and recruitment” where 
that term is used. While recruitment and radicalization are distinct, the literature has 
disclosed some interchangeability between the two terms. Recruitment to extremism and 
terrorism is the process of actively soliciting individuals to join an extremist movement 
or commit illegal acts on behalf of the movement.51  Radicalization has been defined as 
“the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts 
of terrorism.”52  Radicalization is distinguished from recruitment in that recruitment 
seeks to add members to a group or to solicit participation in conduct or activities. 
Radicalization requires acceptance of ideology, but not necessarily participation or 
membership in a group.  
Literature distinguishes between radicalization and recruitment, and treats each as 
an element of terrorist violence.53 There is commonality between recruitment and 
radicalization in regard to the focus population of each. Both target vulnerable 
individuals within a population for indoctrination to a worldview and/or action to 
promote that worldview.54  Since the target and goals of recruitment and radicalization 
are consistent, the distinction between the two becomes cloudy when evaluating the role 
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of the Internet in both. Brian Michael Jenkins points out that the complete phrase, 
“radicalization and recruitment to terrorist violence,” is preferred by analysts because 
legal intervention can occur only when extremism turns to criminal incitement and 
violent action or manifest intent to engage in violence.”55  
Radicalization can be categorized as cognitive radicalization and violent 
radicalization. Cognitive radicalization is the process where an individual refutes and 
replaces the legitimacy of an existing social order with ideas severely at odds with the 
mainstream.56  Violent radicalization occurs when an individual takes violent action to 
“further the views derived from cognitive radicalism.”57   Since cognitive radicalization 
is the gateway to violent radicalization, and since violent radicalization encompasses 
recruitment to violence, Internet radicalization will be reviewed in regard to cognitive 
radicalization to avoid confusion between recruitment and radicalization.  
C. RADICALIZATION CAUSES AND RADICALIZATION PROCESS 
Internet radicalization cannot be justified as a legitimate concept if CMC does not 
have a substantial impact on the causes of radicalization or the radicalization process. 
Studies examining radicalization provide causation and process theories that can be used 
to analyze where and how the Internet functionalities and CMC have impact. 
Determining whether Internet radicalization exists requires reviewing radicalization 
theories to evaluate where in the radicalization models CMC may likely have radicalizing 
impact, be observed most often, or attributed to vulnerabilities.  
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1. Radicalization Causation 
Multiple radicalization theories exist and include causes linked to structural 
factors, personal factors, social identity and economic deprivation.58 59 John Horgan 
states, “Given that so many people are exposed to the presumed generating conditions for 
terrorism (or “root causes”), the triggering factors and catalysts—or both for religious 
and political mobilization—that may lead to engagement in violent activity, why is it that 
so few people actually become recruited?”60 (Italics in the original.)  This same question 
can be asked when Internet radicalization and recruitment does exist: Why are so few 
people actually radicalized and recruited by the Internet?  When analyzing the difference 
between Islamic terrorism in Europe and the U.S. and the role CMC plays, Sageman 
found that in the U.S. individuals “read and chat about global jihadi terrorist ideology on 
the Internet, just like their European counterparts. Yet for most American Muslims, the 
terrorist message does not become a catalyst to action as it does for their European 
counterparts, since it does not resonate with their beliefs or personal experiences.”61  This 
point identifies that the cause of radicalization has its roots in social problems, and not in 
the mere fact that jihadi or radicalizing material is accessible on the Internet. Hence, root 
causes based in social, political, economic and religious issues must be associated and 
examined in conjunction with the free availability of radical Islamic content.  
The European Union defines radicalization as “the phenomenon of people 
embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism.”62  A EU 
radicalization study has categorized radicalizing factors with three levels and linked the 
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levels to causes and catalysts.63  The three levels are External, Social and Individual. 
External-level causes are linked to the political, economic and cultural conditions 
affecting the radicalized individual. Social-level causes include social identity, network 
dynamics and relative deprivation. Individual-level causes include psychological 
characteristics, personal experiences and rationality. Catalysts affect all three levels, and 
include recruitment efforts and triggering events such as a personal tragedy or a 
significant world event.64   CMC and network functionalities can impact the Social-level 
causes and exploit Individual-level causes in the top-down model. Internet recruitment 
can be effective as a catalyst.  
Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen summarized the socio-psychological and psychological 
approaches to violent radicalization and mobilization.65  She categorizes these into three 
major schools: Sociological approaches, Individual-level approaches and Group Process 
approaches. Sociological approaches focus on how external factors impact individual and 
group behavior and the Individual-level approaches focus on psychological attributes. 
Dalgaard-Nielsen’s Sociological approaches encompass the EU study External and Social 
levels. Individual-level approaches are consistent with the EU Individual level.66   The 
Group Processes approach looks at “how certain social process can lead ‘normal’ people 
to do extraordinary things.”67  Group Process looks at “socialization, bonding and peer 
pressure within small groups nested within wider violent subcultures.”68  This approach 
parallels, but is narrower than the EU Social level. Group Process approach focuses on 
the processes involved in radicalization in terms of psychological rewards rather than 
psychological needs.69  CMC and network functionalities can exploit areas within Group 
Processes in both the top-down and bottom-up frameworks:  Top-down in regard to the 
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group controls on the individual and bottom-up in regard to the network and virtual 
relationships facilitated by Internet social media components. Extremist groups recruit 
top-down through inspirational and informational web pages, blogs and discussion 
groups, which provide the vulnerable individual with a “personal role, a clear worldview 
and a righteous purpose.”70  The recruiting group controls the rewards associated with 
membership, giving it the ability to exert pressure on the vulnerable individual to act in 
compliance with the group’s goals. Bottom-up group formation is facilitated by network 
communication capabilities such as email, text messaging, Internet relay chat rooms, 
video conferencing, and social applications such as Twitter and Facebook. These 
functionalities enable widely scattered people to find others with common interests, and 
coalesce them into virtual groups where group dynamics can influence individual and 
collective identity and conduct. John Horgan illustrates the commonality between these 
two approaches.  
Horgan finds the “terrorist mind” is a product of “increased socialization into a 
terrorist movement and its associated engagement in illegal activity” and focused 
behavior relevant to the “context of a terrorist movement.”71  The socialization process 
Horgan identifies can be found in both radicalization and recruitment when he states, 
“From a personal and social perspective, this often means that a socialization into 
terrorism, and those associated with it, sees a socialization away from nonrelevant 
friends, family, and the person’s former life.”72 (Italics in original.)  Socialization into 
terrorism supports the definition of recruitment. Socialization away from the 
conventional describes radicalization. Both involve Group Process socialization bond 
dynamics. The vital role the Internet plays in creating social bonds has been recognized 
in a Homeland Security Institute White Paper on Internet recruitment and radicalization 
of youths.73    
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2. Radicalization Process 
In a New York Police Department radicalization case study, Silber and Bhatt 
found jihadist ideology as the motivator for radicalization and that the process moves 
through four phases:  pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and 
jihadization.74   The case study recognizes the impact of the Internet on the individual and 
the driving motivation for radicalization as an “individual looking for an identity and a 
cause” that is often found in extremists Islam.75  CMC and Internet functionalities create 
opportunities in each of the NYPD stages to instruct, socialize, indoctrinate and recruit, 
as described earlier.76  
The FBI created a radicalization model similar to that of the NYPD. The FBI 
model has four stages: pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination and action.77  
These categories are similar to NYPD, but the NYPD self-identification model ties more 
into joining a group and forming a new identity78 rather than accepting a cause, as in the 
FBI model.79   
Dr. Fathali Moghaddam constructed a “staircase to terrorism” model based on 
identity transformation, and global and social context to describe the psychological 
processes moving a person to engage in terrorism.80  Moghaddam’s model consists of six 
metaphorical floors, including an all-inclusive ground floor, where the subject ascending 
each level encounters societal conditions that challenge the individual’s personal and 
collective identity and instigate a response to those conditions. Moghaddam identifies 
feelings of fairness and relative deprivation as a primary component of the ground 
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floor;81 on the first floor, the individual seeks opportunities for greater justice;82 on the 
second floor, he begins identifying out-groups to blame for the perceived injustice and 
engages in displaced aggression;83 progressing to the third floor, the individual identifies 
with the morality of the terrorists to justify violence to address the perceived injustice;84 
on the fourth floor, an adversarial “us-versus-them” view develops and the individual is 
recruited to join a terrorist organization;85 and finally, on the fifth floor, the individual 
carries out the terrorist act.86  For purposes of Internet radicalization assessment, the 
staircase model is useful in applying only the ground and first floor because these stages 
correlate with pre-radicalized conduct. The inclusive ground floor recognizes vulnerable 
individuals experiencing social and external causation elements that CMC enflame. The 
first floor describes knowledge seekers who may use Internet functionalities to learn 
about societal issues. Information conveyed by CMC regarding distant conflicts can 
instigate relative deprivation and encourage group identification in locations where 
conflicts and issues would not matter much but for global communication.87 88  The 
second and subsequent floors associate with a radicalized individual developing deeper 
entrenchment in extremist ideology and activity.  
In the Leaderless Jihad, Sageman presents a radicalization model similar to 
Moghaddam. Sageman focuses on circumstances affecting the Islamic community, the 
individual’s interpretation of the circumstances and reaction to the situation. He identifies 
four stages: moral outrage, war against Islam, resonance with personal experience and 
mobilized by networks.89  The first two stages focus on the anger created by perceptions 
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of humiliation and injustice and need to respond to defend Islam.90  Resonance with 
personal experience involves personally identifying with the perceived humiliation and 
injustice and developing resentment.91  Mobilization involves recruitment and joining 
others who share the outrage, beliefs and experiences.92   
Both Moghaddam and Sageman’s models focus on the impact of perceptions that 
push an individual to radicalize and engage in terrorist conduct. Moghaddam’s model 
seeks to understand the psychology of terrorism, and Sageman seeks to understand how 
terror networks are formed. The NYPD and FBI models recognize radicalization causes, 
but focus on identifying observable conduct indicating progress toward terrorism.  
Understanding Internet radicalization through the radicalization process and causation 
requires synthesizing a process timeline with objective indicators that can be attributed to 
the stage in the process. Sageman and Moghaddam’s models focus on the impact of 
conditions on the individual; therefore, study of the impact of CMC requires discovering 
the direct impact on the CMC users. Direct contact with those engaged in CMC would be 
necessary, and cannot be studied in this thesis. The manifestations attributed to the stages 
in the law enforcement models provide examples of observable conduct, but lack the 
scholarly rigor to associate the conduct with root causes. A framework must be created to 
associate a law enforcement model with a model having observable indicators. The 
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman study provides workable objective indicators.  
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman did an empirical study of 117 homegrown 
terrorists from the UK and U.S. to determine the path to radicalization.93  The study 
disclosed six manifestations of the radicalization process: adopting a legalistic 
interpretation of Islam, trusting only select religious authorities, perceiving a schism 
between Islam and the West, low tolerance for perceived theological deviance, attempts 
to impose religious beliefs on others, and political radicalization.94   CMC can provide 
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tailored information to foster legalistic interpretations of Islam, promote the perceived 
schism between Islam and the West, and encourage political radicalization. These stages 
appear to be consistent outcomes within the social causation categories. The remaining 
three stages—trust, low tolerance and proselytization—reflect individual responses or 
dispositions that may or may not be manipulated with CMC. Each of these behaviors 
implies the move to radical thought when displayed. For example, email, blogs and chat 
rooms can facilitate access to a respected cleric across the sea, but the same 
functionalities cannot directly impart trust. Trust can be implied from two-way 
communication for advice and guidance, but the creation or origination of the trust cannot 
be easily determined. Objective evidence of trust helps identify the mindset of the 
individual, but not causation. In the same regard, CMC can be used as a proselytizing 
tool, and such use can help gauge the move to or the existence of a radical worldview. 
Intolerance may be articulated in CMC and also provides evidence of a worldview shift.  
The correlation of causation, process and objective behaviors provides 
components to create a framework that may be utilized in evaluating Internet 
radicalization. Matching the NYPD model with the Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 
behaviors provides a framework to evaluate radicalization staging.  Further description of 
this synthesis is explained in the Findings section.  
3. Self-Radicalization 
The concept of self-radicalization resulting from extremist-generated CMC 
appears throughout the literature. Self-radicalization is the theory that a person can 
consume radicalizing material and transform from a conventional worldview to a radical 
worldview without intervention by a third party.95 Self-radicalized individuals have been 
characterized as “lone wolves.”  CMC content provides information that in the past was 
delivered by traditional recruiters to actively radicalize targets.96 A lone individual at a 
computer accessing radicalizing content, absorbing blog commentaries and participating 
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in chat rooms conjures an image of violent madness caused by the “cyber-inputs,” much 
like drug-induced delirium. As stated by research analyst Mohamed Abdul Saddiq, self-
radicalizing through the Internet cast users “…as mindless automatons readily susceptible 
to the unparalleled horrors that the Internet seems to pose.”97 The individual is robbed of 
self-control and succumbs to the morphine of ideas—self-induced at initiation, but 
involuntary once hooked. In correlation with this picture, juveniles have been identified 
at risk for self-radicalization through CMC due to the vulnerability of their age.98   
Dr. Marc Sageman identifies how radicalization has transitioned from face-to-face 
interaction to online radicalization and recognizes self-radicalization as a product of self-
recruitment. He stated to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs that “recruitment is self-recruitment” and that “self-recruited 
upstarts do not need any outsiders to try to join the terrorist social movement.”99  
According to this view, the lurking web surfer self-connects bottom-up to terrorist 
networks and then self-radicalizes through exploration and participation. This viewpoint 
implies radicalization caused by seeker conduct and relationship dynamics rather than the 
existence of CMC and Internet functionalities. CMC facilitates the seeker’s entry to 
networks, provides answers to inquiries and assists progress through stages to 
radicalization. Radicalization through CMC and Internet functionalities is secondary and 
weakens a claim advancing self-radicalization. Entry to a network, whether virtual or 
real, removes the isolation necessary to claim self-radicalization.  
David Tucker challenges aspects of Sageman’s claim that the interactivity of the 
Internet has changed relationships to facilitate radicalization and that websites do not 
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drive extremist Islam.100  Tucker questions the validity of Sageman’s support for the 
impact of the Internet on relationships and Sageman’s assertion that website content does 
not drive extremist Islam, since the seekers have already chosen to view the content to 
support their existing opinions.101   Tucker cites the Colleen LaRose (Jihad Jane) case as 
an example of someone who radicalized through the Internet, and subsequently self-
recruited and mobilized.102 The LaRose case is analyzed as part of this thesis, and her 
individual vulnerability may have substantially contributed to her radicalization. Tucker’s 
point, however, does highlight a “chicken and egg” issue regarding self-radicalization. 
Whether access to the network comes before radicalization or the opposite can help 
distinguish self-radicalization from recruitment. The network first favors relationship 
building and influence-establishing recruitment—whereas CMC provided information 
first and then network access may support self-radicalization.  Accessing the network 
first supports Sageman’s contention that the seeker has already embraced an extremist 
worldview. Information seeking first does not refute Sageman, but it leaves a question of 
inquiry motive. Information regarding why the person seeks extremist content can be 
innocent curiosity, or confirmation of ideology driven by root causes.  
Brian Michael Jenkins examined lone-wolf terrorism and finds that radicalization 
and recruitment to terrorism is an individual decision,103 but that the concept of lone wolf 
is overstated and attributes the term “stray dogs” as more appropriate.104  Jenkins also 
found that the Internet might inspire individuals, but can “become a substitute for action 
allowing would-be terrorists to safely engage in vicarious terrorism” rather than endure 
the risks of real action.105  Jenkins states, “Reaching does not mean radicalizing, and 
radicalizing does not mean recruitment to violent jihad. The Internet has facilitated access 
to many more recruits than al Qaeda could reach personally, but it is low yield mining.”  
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The Internet contributes to radicalization, but causation is not attributed to it. The 
effectiveness is questionable as Jenkins states, “it has not yet produced the army of 
action-oriented acolytes.”106  Hence, self-radicalization through the Internet, even if it 
does exist, may not be the overwhelming threat it is often perceived to be.  
A study by Scott Helfstein of the Center for Counterterrorism at West Point 
complements Jenkins’s contention. Helfstein studied the spread of violent extremism 
through a social network analysis and found that radicalization requires strong social 
support and that data did not support the fear of lone-wolf terrorists.107  He does, 
however, acknowledge that the virtual community created by Internet social networking 
may provide the necessary social support and resemble lone-wolf incidents.108  This 
finding supports CMC as a way to enter a virtual community and facilitate radicalization. 
Hence, the term “lone wolf” may be a misnomer in radicalization, but may have some 
operational application since “…through the lens of execution, whereby individuals who 
perpetrate an attack by themselves are by definition lone wolves.”109   
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Validating the existence of an Internet radicalization threat cannot be 
accomplished by simply determining whether a radicalized individual viewed CMC or 
used Internet functionalities in the course of his or her life. The questions to be answered 
are whether extremist CMC initiated or instigated the extremist worldview change and 
whether CMC content and Internet functionalities drove the radicalization process. To 
answer these questions, information must be analyzed to determine the role of CMC, 
conventional communication, and vulnerabilities associated with the root causes of 
radicalization. 
Studies of root causes of radicalization provide frameworks to evaluate the 
influence of particular variables impacting worldview shifts. Examining cases where the 
Internet has been blamed as exacerbating or causing radicalization and weighing the root 
causes against the CMC will give some objective review as to whether the Internet drives 
radicalization or merely facilitates what would have happened independent of the 
Internet. The trick is in determining when CMC can be said to overwhelm the root cause 
impact so that some validity can be given to the term Internet radicalization.    
The methodology used in this thesis attempts to expand the method used by David 
Tucker in his book, Illuminating the Dark Arts of War.110  Tucker reviewed how the 
Internet has changed how terrorists operate, and challenges the assertions by Marc 
Sageman regarding the impact of the Internet on human relationships and the impact of 
Internet websites to inspire extremist radicalization.111  In his analysis of the problem, 
Tucker provides a method to evaluate the terrorist cases Sageman cites as evidence of the 
impact of the Internet on terrorist activity. Tucker compared the face-to-face interaction 
of the terror cell members with Internet interaction and support obtained from the 
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Internet.112  His analysis evaluated the type and sequence of terrorist interaction to 
challenge Sageman’s assertions. The methodology used here will expand upon the 
categorizing and sequencing with greater detail.  
For the purposes of this thesis, CMC will be deemed a cause in the absence of 
vulnerabilities connected to a root cause and provable separation from direct radicalizing 
non-Internet content or people. Since the individual operating the computer cannot access 
radicalizing content on the Internet without intentional action, this thesis will assume that 
the curiosity driving the individual is not driven by root causes unless a root cause exists. 
For example, seeking out information as a result of relative deprivation or incidents 
directly affecting the individual would be beyond normal curiosity, as the information 
seeking is in response to an existing root cause; however, learning about Islam as a non-
Muslim or moderate Muslim as a seeker of religious information would be classified as 
normal curiosity.  
B. CASE SELECTION 
Cases were selected by word-searching variations of the terms “Internet & 
radicalization & Islam” through research databases, news services, library indices and 
Internet search engines.113 Articles found were reviewed to identify specific terrorism-
related incidents attributed to Internet radicalization or recruitment. Congressional 
hearings were searched to discover cases mentioned by witnesses to illustrate the threat 
of radicalizing content on the Internet or as an example of Internet radicalization. 
Scholarly articles providing examples of Internet radicalization and recruitment were also 
utilized to identify study cases. The case selection is not exhaustive, but intended to 
obtain a significant sample of cases that are alleged to result from Internet radicalization.  
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Twenty-five cases were identified and specific information was obtained from 
news reports, available criminal indictments and affidavits, and case studies. Some 
reports included written documents produced by the case subject such as the letters of 
Carlos Bledsoe to U.S. District Judge Herbert Wright, Jr., and written documents 
included in the February 2012 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Zachary Chesser.114  The cases were evaluated to determine 
whether sufficient information could be found to permit analysis for Internet 
radicalization and whether the known facts could clearly exclude the Internet as a 
radicalizing cause. An example of clear exclusion would be known jihadists accessing the 
Internet for utility as a tool rather than a knowledge seeker accessing for enlightenment 
about Islam or the conditions of the Muslim world. A known jihadist’s radicalization is 
assumed, whereas the knowledge seeker is unknown and subject to review. Cases where 
known jihadists used the Internet for recruitment, proselytizing and operations are 
excluded as support or utility usage. Cases involving multiple individuals in a network, 
such as the Toronto 18 Canadian Bomb Plot and the Somali Youth Radicalization cases, 
are excluded since defining the variable within collective group as a singularity would be 
not benefit the study. Some individuals associated with the Toronto 18 case, however, are 
included in the study. Vetting the initial twenty-five cases for exclusion resulted in a final 
group of nine cases likely to provide insight into the existence of Internet radicalization.  
Despite articles inferring connections to Internet radicalization, sixteen of the 
twenty-five cases were not suitable for analysis in this thesis. The cases, however, 
provide some insight into how CMC is being used and the assumptions made by 
observers as to the impact of CMC in the incidents. Frequently, articles cite these cases or 
cite authorities that used these cases to support their work. The sixteen cases are 
summarized in the Appendix. Some of the cases have connections to the nine cases that 
were analyzed. For example, the Toronto 18 Canadian Bomb plot includes individuals in 
the study and jihadist network links to others. The summaries are included for reference 
and for review to illustrate the breath of the cases where Internet radicalization or CMC is 
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perceived as enhancing the terror threat and to provide information to the reader of some 
links mentioned in the case summaries. Network analysis is outside the focus of this 
thesis; however, limiting the reader to summaries for only the nine selected cases may not 
provide the broad picture needed to evaluate the complexity of the CMC issue.  
C. OUTCOME PROBLEM AND VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION 
The difficulty in attributing causation is that the defined outcome—
radicalization—is the same in both conventional radicalization and Internet 
radicalization. The “if A then B” analysis becomes problematic when trying to attribute 
an outcome to a particular variable and the variable affecting the outcome cannot be 
isolated and is difficult to measure. Several variables affect the outcome with varying 
influence, weight, impact, significance and relevance. In this study, we examine three 
variables contributing to radicalization: conventional communication, computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) and vulnerability.  
1. Variables: Conventional Communication, Computer-Mediated 
Communication and Vulnerability   
Cases were evaluated to determine whether the case subjects engaged in 
conventional communication with Islamic extremists or jihadi groups, CMC with Islamic 
extremists or jihadi groups, or accessed Islamic extremist or jihadi CMC content, and 
whether the subjects could be deemed vulnerable using the EU radicalization model 
defining radicalization causation in terms of individual, social and external elements. 
Conventional communications include but are not limited to face-to-face contact, 
telephone conversations, and written communication through paper and ink. CMC 
includes chat rooms, video chats, blogs, electronic bulletin boards, websites, and 
extremist content delivered through computer interface. Since case selection required 
CMC, the CMC variable will be evaluated in reference to communication content. CMC 
content is separated as instructional, propaganda, inspirational, operational and travel 
information. Categorizing CMC content assists in determining the stage of radicalization 
using the NYPD model and helps to distinguish an information seeker from an operative. 
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2. Vulnerability Framework 
The causes of radicalization have been reviewed in terms of psychology, social 
psychology, sociology, political science and religion. The sociology, psychological and 
social psychology models review the root causes of radicalization and break them into 
external, social and individual elements. These broad classifications are appropriate due 
to the crossover in disciplines that use these references in some manner. Each element 
has components found to be driving radicalization. External elements include economic 
circumstance, political environment and cultural conditions. Social elements typically 
involve analyzing radicalization through social identity, network dynamics and relative 
deprivation. Individual elements involve psychological characteristics, personal 
experiences and impaired rationality. Since this study is in regard to Islam, religious 
factors will be considered influential through all causation classifications. The cases 
reviewed are evaluated to determine which vulnerability components can be found within 
the causation element. The association of cause with the underlying vulnerabilities 
provides groupings for analysis  
The vulnerability components will be defined as follows: 
Table 1.   Causation-Vulnerability Correlation Table 
Causation Element Vulnerability Component 
Individual Vulnerability caused by age, disability, psychology, emotional 
state, physical condition or impaired rationality.  
External Vulnerability due to economic, political and cultural 
circumstances 
Social Vulnerability deemed due to dynamics involving social identity, 
group identity, relative deprivation and group processes. 
D. ANALYSIS METHOD 
Anecdotal accounts of the impact of CMC have inductively shaped a direct 
relationship between CMC and radicalization to conclude that CMC is a driving force 
behind radicalization. The mere presence of CMC in radicalization cases has led to the 
theory that radicalization is caused by extremist CMC and results in classifying such 
radicalization as Internet radicalization. This thesis looks at the interrelationship between 
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three variables to determine whether CMC has a more prominent impact than the other 
two variables, dependence between variables, and the time sequence the variables appear 
in the subject’s radicalization process. Reviewing the variables in relation to each other 
will uncover non-CMC correlations that may have been underestimated in the anecdotal 
causation scheme. If CMC is present without the significant contribution of conventional 
communication and without a significant vulnerability, then likelihood exists that 
radicalization was caused by CMC. If all three are present, then the analysis requires 
evaluating the sequence the variables appeared in the life of the subject, the 
persuasiveness and prominence of the particular variable in regard to the other two, and 
the possible dependence of one variable on the other. For example, if a vulnerable 
individual attends a radical mosque and then uses CMC to further information gathering 
and networking, no firm conclusion can be wrought. This is because all variables have 
significant impact; together they most likely result in a collective impact. The sequence 
becomes significant since the first extremist contact may instigate the remaining 
variables. Hence, in this example, greater weight would be given to the vulnerability and 
conventional communication rather than CMC. With the same reasoning, a vulnerable 
individual who seeks information on Islam and stumbles on radical jihadi websites—and 
later joins a virtual network of radicals, travels to a radical mosque or has a personal 
event that catalyzes the individual’s worldview change—would likely support a 
proximate cause as the initial CMC interaction, rather than the variable events following. 
If, however, one variable far outweighs the others in impact, quantity and quality of 
exposure, or personal history, then that persuasive and prominent variable likely plays a 
greater role in the radicalization than do the others. Two variables existing without the 
third results in the evaluation of the two variables directly where timing and impact can 




A. CASE REVIEW SUMMARY 
Background and radicalization information from the nine selected cases are 
summarized in this section. Each of the nine cases was reviewed to determine the 
presence of the variables and the appropriate category for components of CMC and 
classification of the Vulnerability variable.  
Table 2 summarizes the case review results. A cell marked with an X shows that 
the item existed. An N is used in the Conventional Communication column denotes 
information that the variable did not exist and a U is unknown. Blank cells in the CMC 
variable denote the absence of information regarding that variable component. The 
Vulnerability column provides the causation element and the vulnerability component. 
Vulnerability can have more than one cause; therefore, the analysis for vulnerability may 
be greater than the number of cases reviewed. 
Table 2.   Variable Table 
Case Name Conventional CMC Vulnerability 
  Inst Insp Prop Ops Travel  
Hamaad Munshi X X   X  Individual: Youth 
Roshonara Choudhry N  X X   Social: Relative 
Deprivation 
Nicky Reilly X X X X   Individual: Mental 
Health 




X X X X X  Individual: Youth 
Arid Uka aka Abu 
Reyyan 
X  X X   Social: Relative 
Deprivation;  
Individual: Youth 
Betim Kaziu and 
Sulejah Hadzovic 








Abdul Basheer Abul 
Kader 
U   X   Social: Relative 
Deprivation 
Totals 5 4 5 8 3 1  
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1. Hamaad Munshi 
Hamaad Munshi is the grandson of a UK Shariaa judge and started connecting 
with Islamic militants at fifteen years old.115  Munshi used the Internet to access 
information about creating explosives and suicide vests and to participate in jihadist web 
groups.116  He had direct contact with jihadist website developer Aabid Khan at a local 
mosque. Aabid Khan is the Islamist militant recruiter who communicated with the 
Toronto 18 through the Internet and attended terrorist training camps in Pakistan. 
Munshi’s web presence mainly involved closed networks of other extremists and was 
likely recruited by Khan to join the online network that included al Qaeda Internet 
administrator Younes Tsouli aka Irhabi007.117  The likelihood that his devout Muslim 
family contributed to his extremist viewpoint must be given considerable weight. 
Radicalization likely occurred prior to accessing radicalizing material on the Internet and 
would have been cultivated by the top-down recruitment efforts of Khan. Munshi’s youth 
calls into question whether his age plays a substantial part in his susceptibility to 
radicalization.  
2. Roshonara Choudhry 
Roshonara Choudhry is a Muslim woman who, on May 14, 2010, stabbed UK 
Parliament Member Stephen Timms for voting to declare war against Iraq. The case 
appears to be self-radicalization because the only known radicalizing influence was the 
radical online sermons Choudhry listened to on the Internet.118 Choudhry says she 
listened online and admitted viewing jihadist websites including the Revolution Muslim 
website run by Jesse Curtis Morton.119  She stated her ideas for vengeance came from 
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listening to more than one hundred hours of Internet lectures by Anwar al-Awlaki.120  In 
her third and final year at King’s College, she perceived that the school was doing things 
against her interest as a Muslim. She listened to al-Awlaki’s speeches on the Internet and 
decided that Muslims should look out for each other, and not sit back and do nothing 
when other Muslims suffer.121 She said that a video of Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, 
declaring that every Muslim is obligated to defend Muslim land, persuaded her to seek 
revenge on behalf of the people of Iraq and attempt to kill Timms for his vote on the Iraq 
war. This impetus for violence reflects relative deprivation theory for radicalization. 
Police believe she had no direct contact with Islamic extremists.122  Prior to her 
radicalization, Choudhry was an exceptional student with a bright future. Her 
Bangladeshi parents had no indication that she would radicalize. She claims to have 
stumbled across the radical videos on YouTube. Up until that point, she said, she did not 
know much about her religion.123  Seeking information on the Internet to learn about her 
religion places her earliest Internet use in the self-identification category; however, it 
should be pointed out that she moved directly and swiftly into indoctrination, political 
radicalization and to jihadization.  
3. Nicky Reilly 
Nicky Reilly was convicted for attempting a terror bombing in Exeter, England, 
on May 22, 2008. He created a caustic chemical bomb in a soda bottle and when he was 
constructing it in a restaurant washroom it exploded in his hands.124  Reilly is viewed as 
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mentally disabled and said to have a mind of a child. He was diagnosed with Asperger’s 
Syndrome, depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder.125  Medical professionals, 
who knew him, however, said he had special needs, but was not stupid and displayed 
linear thinking.126  Reilly attempted suicide twice. His family life was poor with a 
stepfather who was a heroin dealer.127  He became obsessed with the 9/11 attacks and 
saw the U.S. and UK as evil and frequently viewed violent videos depicting beheadings. 
He converted to Islam in 2003 and began to attend mosques. He was said to continuously 
use the computer.128 Devon and Cornwall Police Deputy Chief Constable Tony Melville 
has stated, “We believe that, despite his weak and vulnerable state, he was preyed upon, 
radicalised and taken advantage of.”129  This case provides support that Internet 
propaganda can have an effect on a mentally challenged individual. Radicalization 
occurred, but it is not certain whether another person that Reilly associated with recruited 
him to act. There are reports that Reilly received a text message of encouragement shortly 
before he went to the restaurant with the bomb.130  Reilly’s vulnerability plays a 
substantial role, as does conventional communication in providing 9/11 information and 
relationships at the local mosque.  
4. Colleen LaRose aka Jihad Jane: 
Colleen Larose converted to Islam and assumed the name Jihad Jane and Fatima 
LaRose on the Internet. As Jihad Jane, LaRose posted a comment on YouTube stating she 
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is “desperate to do something somehow to help” the suffering Muslim people.131  She 
became a militant jihadist and was arrested when she attempted to fly to the Netherlands 
as part of a plot to kill Swedish artist Lars Vilks. Vilks had angered Muslims when he 
created a portrait of the prophet Muhammad as a dog. As part of the Vilks plot, she was 
in contact with others through the Internet including Ali Charaf Damache in Ireland and 
Mohammad Hassan Khalid in Maryland.132  News reports of interviews with LaRose’s 
neighbors said, “she is a polite yet eccentric woman who was known to talk loudly to her 
cats and on occasion drown her sorrows by ‘hitting the bottle hard.’”133  She had 
attempted suicide and was treated for depression.134  Her mental health, instability in her 
personal life and alcoholism likely made her susceptible to the jihadist message. There is 
insufficient information to determine whether her conversion to Islam was facilitated by 
direct contact or whether she sought the information online and converted. Conveniently 
delivered Internet content may have contributed to her conversion; however, without 
more information, the role the Internet played initially is only speculation. Her case 
illustrates the risk of vulnerable individuals being affected by radicalizing content and 
extremist networks using CMC. The absence of information about conventional 
communication with the local Muslim population results in a strong implication that 
CMC catalyzed the change to radical Islam and connected her to the jihadi network that 
she ultimately sought to assist.  
5. Mohammed Hassan Khalid: 
Mohammed Hassan Khalid was radicalized as a juvenile and is believed to be the 
youngest person charged for terrorism in a U.S. civilian court.135  Khalid is a Pakistani 
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citizen who moved from Pakistan to Baltimore in 2008. As early as age fifteen, he sought 
out and corresponded through Internet and chat rooms with the same network as Colleen 
LaRose and participated in plans to send money to fund the group’s plan to kill Swedish 
artist Lars Vilks. Khalid also had contact with another terror arrestee, Emerson Begolly 
and commented online during a chat to Begolly that he would like to commit “Columbine 
like attacks,” referencing the massacre of students at a Colorado high school by two 
students.136  His assimilation into the jihadist network resulted from CMC, but whether 
he was radicalized prior to the contacts is uncertain. His age creates some concern about 
susceptibility, just as the mental condition of Nicky Reilly created similar concern. The 
cause of his radicalization is uncertain, but the cause of his recruitment can be attributed 
to CMC. But for the Internet communication functionalities, he would not have been in 
contact with extremists located in Pennsylvania (LaRose and Begolly) and Ireland (Ali 
Charaf Damache.)  He was arrested on July 6, 2011, and pled guilty on May 4, 2012, to 
terrorism charges.137 
6. Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader 
Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader was arrested after he attempted to join the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in February 2007.138  It is thought that Abdul Basheer self-radicalized 
through Internet content.139  Abdul Basheer is a Singaporean lawyer who worked at a top 
law firm and was a well-known lecturer until his militant Islamic views led him to 
attempt to travel to Afghanistan.140  Prior to radicalizing, Abdul Basheer was a non-
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observant Muslim who enjoyed nightlife.141  The Singapore Home Ministry claims 
Basheer’s views were “shaped by radical discourse that he avidly looked up on the 
Internet,” and that he began developing radical mindset in 2004 “to wage militant jihad in 
the land where Muslims were under attack.”142  He had turned to the Internet for answers 
to his questions on religion and chanced upon radical explanations that resonated with 
him. Waging jihad in Muslim lands to engage perceived injustices to Muslims indicates 
radicalization and action motivated by relative deprivation. The motivation to move from 
non-practicing Muslim in a successful legal career to a jihadist is unclear, but as a seeker, 
Basheer used CMC to guide his worldview shift. Relative deprivation may have driven 
his recruitment, but there is insufficient evidence to determine whether it drove him to 
seek out Islamic content on the Internet. Hence, without further information about 
conventional communication, it appears CMC played a significant role in his 
radicalization. 
7. Arid Uka aka Abu Reyyan 
Arid Uka, armed with a pistol, attacked and killed U.S. servicemen at the 
Frankfurt, Germany airport in February 2011. He told police the night before the attack 
his desire to kill U.S. servicemen was fueled by playing violent video games and viewing 
a video online in which U.S. soldiers were apparently raping a Muslim girl.143  The 
twenty-one year old Kosovo Albanian came from a devout but not deeply religious 
Muslim family with a father who was very strict and harsh with him. 144  Uka began to 
have trouble in school, and the principal suspected emotional problems or depression.145  
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It was reported that Uka was likely radicalized a few weeks before the shooting.146  In 
2009, four to five weeks before the attack, Uka developed a web of digital acquaintances 
in the Islamist community including radical Islamic preachers.147  Uka joined an Islamist 
Facebook group called Dawa FFM, listened to lectures from that group and wrote about 
jihad.148 The role of Islam in his life became more apparent in his online gaming 
personas. His email name and Facebook name took on Islamic significance as a virtual 
identity.149  Whether Uka had conventional communication with Islamic extremists is 
uncertain, but likely. He resided in the same apartment complex as al Qaeda associate 
Rami Makanesi, and it is likely he had contact with him.150 151  This case shows that the 
Internet did have some impact on moving Arid Uka to action, but indications of mental or 
emotional problems coupled with second-generation diaspora issues152 may be the root 
cause of radicalization rather than content he found on the Internet. If his contact with 
Rami Makanesi influenced him, the Internet and violent video games may have supported 
and inspired but not caused his extremist views and actions.  
8. Betim Kaziu and Sulejah Hadzovic 
Betim Kaziu and Sulejah Hadzovic came from Muslim families and grew up in 
Brooklyn, New York. Kaziu was convicted and sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison 
for conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, conspiracy to provide material 
support to terrorists, attempt to provide material support to a foreign terrorist 
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organization, and conspiracy to use a firearm.153 154 Kaziu and Hadzovic’s families 
emigrated from Yugoslavia. Hadzovic claims that he and Kaziu radicalized after viewing 
videos of Osama bin Laden. Both individuals traveled to Egypt for terror training. 
Hadzovic returned to the U.S. after he heard a bridge-building speech by President Barak 
Obama. Upon his return to the U.S. after the FBI contacted him, he cooperated in the 
government investigation and became a prosecution witness against Kaziu. Kaziu 
continued to travel and attempted to join al-Qaeda and al-Shabab. He was arrested in 
Pakistan and sent back to the U.S. where he was arrested and convicted for aiding 
terrorists.155  Sulejah Hadzovic testified, “We were upset at what was happening in 
places like Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay, how they were humiliating and 
torturing Muslims there. It’s what ultimately made us want to go and fight in jihad."156 
The conventional news coverage of the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay incidents must 
be considered when evaluating the impact of CMC. The indignities suffered by the 
Muslim prisoners would inspire feelings of injustice to Muslims and result in relative 
deprivation. Radical CMC content would support the in-group/out-group circumstance 
and contribute to radicalization, but inspiration to seek the information likely originated 
with conventional communication. Social conditions brought to the attention of Kaziu 
and Hadzovic by conventional communications may have had a greater impact on the 
path to radicalization than CMC.  Once CMC was accessed, it provided support for 
further movement along the path to jihad, such as contact with jihadists and travel to 
Egypt.  
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9. Mohamed Osman Mohamud 
Somali immigrant Mohamed Osman Mohamud exchanged 150 emails with 
jihadist Samir Khan beginning in February 2009 when Mohamud was seventeen years 
old.157  Mohamud said he began thinking of becoming a jihadist as early as age fifteen.158  
He authored articles for Jihad Recollections, an online jihadi publication.159  There is 
evidence that he had personal contact with an unnamed Pakistani jihadist recruiter in 
Oregon and email correspondence with him in August 2009, after the Pakistani returned 
to Pakistan. University of Minnesota sociology professor Cawo Abdi commented to the 
press regarding the reasons for radicalization of Somali youths stating, “They are trying 
to find somewhere they can fit in. This has led some to join gangs, while other are lured 
by jihadist websites and YouTube videos on the Internet.” 160  Isgow Mohamed, 
executive director of the Northwest Somali Community Organization, stated that he 
believes information received on the Internet influenced Mohamud.161  Unlike the 
Minnesota Somali youth case, this Somali youth focused his jihadist purpose on Osama 
bin Laden and the Afghanistan situation rather than the Somalia and al-Shabab activity. 
He identified with the umma rather than his ethnic group and historical political conflict. 
The unnamed Pakistani jihadi recruiter may have instigated his interest in Afghanistan. 
For this reason, the power of the personal contact can be implied to motivate Mohamud 
more significantly that the Internet content. CMC furthered his association with violent 
jihadists, but his radicalization appears to precede recruitment and commitment to  
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violence. Also, by stating that he had jihadist dreams as early as age fifteen, age 
vulnerability appears as a factor and coincides with the time period that he would have 
met with the unnamed Pakistani.  
B. ANALYSIS  
1. Conventional Communication 
Of the nine cases reviewed, five have evidence of conventional communication 
involving face-to-face contact with jihadists. In three cases—Colleen LaRose, Arid Uka 
and Abdul Basheer Abud Kader—it is unknown whether there was any conventional 
communication with radical Islamists or jihadists. In a single case, Roshonara Choudhry, 
there was no conventional communication at all. Choudhry claims that all of her contact 
with radical Islamist material came from the Internet.  
Table 3.   Conventional Communication 
Conventional Communication  
Face to Face: Mosque 3 




No conventional contact 1 
The conventional communication location has significance, because personal 
contact has been acknowledged as having greater impact than CMC.162  In the Munshi, 
Reilly and Mohamed Osman Mohamud cases, contact occurred at a local mosque. Reilly, 
as a Muslim convert, first encountered radical Islam on the Internet prior to conversion 
and prior to the mosque contacts. Reilly’s sequence of contact differs from lifelong 
Muslim Munshi and weight must be given to the CMC, whereas Munshi’s upbringing 
and Islamic community contacts must be given greater weight than his CMC contacts. In 
Oregon, Somali Mohamud met an unknown Pakistani jihadist recruiter, whom he later 
emailed. Prior to meeting the Pakistani, Mohamud exchanged email with Samir Khan. 
                                                 
162 Bradley M. Okdie and Rosanna E. Guadagno, “Social Influence and Computer Mediated 
Communication,” in Handbook of Research on Computer Mediated Communication, ed. Sigrid Kelsey and 
Kirk St. Amant (IG Global, 2008), 482, doi: 10.4018/978-1-59904-863-5. 
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Mohamud’s CMC, by predating the direct conventional contact, gives greater weight to 
the role of CMC than the conventional contact. Mohammed Hassan Khalid had unknown 
contact in Pakistan, but after immigration to the U.S., he began using the Internet to join 
jihadi groups. Whether he was radicalized due to experiences and contacts in Pakistan is 
not certain, but his youth vulnerability may have played a substantial role in his 
radicalization.  
2. Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) 
All cases have evidence of CMC. The most prevalent content accessed is 
propaganda. All but Hamaad Munshi accessed propaganda. Munshi accessed 
instructional material for creating explosives and suicide vests. His face-to-face contact 
with jihadist website developer Aabid Khan likely provided the impetus to use CMC for 
operational planning. His conservative Islamic family background and youthful contact 
with radical Islam likely explain the absence of propaganda. Munshi, Colleen LaRose and 
Mohammed Hassan Khalid used CMC for operational planning. Four case subjects used 
CMC for instruction. Munshi, LaRose and Mohammed Hassan Khalid were included in 
that group of four. The remaining person, Nicky Reilly, used the Internet to learn how to 
construct a chemical reaction bomb, but there is no information that he used CMC to 
plan, coordinate or execute his attempt to explode the bomb in a restaurant. The link 
between instruction and operation may be significant and indicate a tipping point in the 
use of CMC in transitioning from a seeker of information to a radicalized individual 
recruited for action. Inspirational content was accessed in five of the nine cases. Each of 
the five individuals who viewed inspirational content also viewed propaganda content. In 
two of the five cases, LaRose and Khalid, operational content was accessed; in three 
cases, LaRose, Khalid and Reilly also accessed instructional content. Roshonara 
Choudhry is the only case where only inspirational and propaganda was viewed. Only 
LaRose utilized the Internet for travel information as part of her operation to kill Lars 










Chat room 3 
Forums 4 
Blogs 1 
Text Message 1 
Online Games 1 
All individuals used websites on the worldwide web to access information. Four 
subjects—Reilly, LaRose, Khalid and Uka—used both synchronous and asynchronous 
communication functionalities. Reilly, LaRose, Khalid and Uka used synchronous chat 
rooms. Reilly was the only subject recorded as using text messaging. The same four used 
asynchronous communication through electronic forums. Uka’s information did not 
disclose use of email, but information did disclose email communications by Mohamed 
Osman Mohamud. Reilly and LaRose used blogs. Uka admitted being inspired to jihad 
by violent online games.  
Distinguishing between the use of synchronous and asynchronous communication 
provides some insight into whether the subjects were mere consumers of information or 
participants in a network or group and in active contact with persuasive personalities. The 
synchronous/asynchronous distinction is important when attributing radicalizing power to 
CMC. Asynchronous communication presents one-to-many communication, whereas 
synchronous communication can encompass many-to-one communication—group and 
network type—or one-to-one communication. In both cases of synchronous 
communications, top-down influence and recruitment may be facilitated by the 
relationship between parties that develop from direct contact. The character of the 
relationship becomes more significant than the medium used to make the connection. 
With asynchronous CMC, the availability and the attraction of the material becomes 
significant in drawing interest in the content and facilitating grassroots growth for the 
worldview expressed. A bottom-up influence toward radicalization and recruitment may 
be supported by the message rather than the personality.  
 44
3. Vulnerability 
CMC propaganda often conveys a message of unjust treatment of Muslims to 
instigate feelings of relative deprivation.163 164  CMC can also create a sense of collective 
social identity by bringing unifying information to a population.165  In both the Arid Uka 
and Mohamed Osman Mohamud cases, youth vulnerability and relative deprivation were 
present. Each element is significant, but impressionable youth may offer susceptibility 
that is exploited with content feeding group identification, intergroup conflict and relative 
deprivation. In two of the cases, individual and social factors were present. Six cases 
disclose individual vulnerabilities. Four of the cases involved youthful individuals, and 
two cases, Reilly and LaRose, involved mental health issues. Relative deprivation as a 
social factor was found in five cases.  






Social Identity 1  
Individual 5 
Youth 2  
Mental Health 3  
External 0 
4. Radicalization Process Staging 
Examining the stage in the radicalization process where CMC enters the 
radicalization process helps discern whether CMC influences the other variables or 
whether the other variables motivate the individual to utilize CMC. Sequencing helps 
understand the path to radicalization and the combination of inputs and relative strengths 
that create the output. If CMC appears in an early stage of radicalization, attributing 
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greater power to the messages carried by and the relationships created with CMC can be 
justified. However, if CMC use begins later in the radicalization stages, then the utility of 
CMC to support the radicalizing individual is deemed more significant than the 
worldview changing content. 
If CMC initiates an unfolding sequence of events, CMC can be inferred to cause 
the process to commence, but not necessarily the specific cause of the outcome. CMC is 
the primer, but the ultimate outcome may be dependent upon the other variables in the 
process. Correlation, however, can be attributed to exist in fact rather than in speculation 
if the facts disclose CMC driving further progress through the radicalization process. 
Some impact exists, but cannot be characterized as classical causation. Hence, 
sequencing is important in this thesis for determining the significance of CMC when 
evaluating the pre-existing state of the individual utilizing CMC. Sequencing is relevant 
for analyzing radicalization, since the first contact with extremists through social 
networking or access, and consumption of radicalizing CMC may begin the process of 
radicalization when the other variables are initially absent. Using CMC after the other 
variables are already present and influencing the conduct of the individual reduces 
support for the importance of CMC in driving the outcome.  
The New York City Police Department radicalization model is used for this 
comparison. This model has been criticized for its lack of academic rigor and small 
sample of cases, but the model provides a simple framework for understanding the 
staging process in Islamic radicalization.166  
NYPD created its radicalization model to understand where in the radicalization 
process law enforcement may be able to identify radicalizing behavior revealing terrorist 
intentions and planning. The NYPD model breaks the stages down into pre-
radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization. The model implies a 
timeline and can be used to evaluate the relative stage the individual was in when CMC 
contributed to radicalization. Identifying individual conduct that can relate to the  
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particular radicalization stage becomes tricky when using the NYPD model alone. To tie 
the model to behavior, this thesis associates the NYPD framework with behaviors 
identified by Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman.  
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman provide six behavior manifestations that can be 
observed and associated with the indoctrination phase. The behaviors appear cumulative 
as the person proceeds through radicalization, and can be thought of as steps in a 
progression within the indoctrination stage. Fragmenting the indoctrination phase in this 
manner assists in discerning conduct in the early indoctrination phase from the self-
identification phase and the late indoctrination phase from the jihadization phase. The 
breakdown also assists in determining whether a path to indoctrination has already been 
set prior to using CMC. For example, an individual entering the cyber-realm for the first 
time to contribute to proselytizing-advocating force would be considered well on his way 
to full radicalization with CMC being only a tool. Conversely, if the individual were 
seeking support for a legalistic interpretation of Islam when he enters the cyber-realm, 
CMC content would have a substantial impact on whether he progresses further.  
Behaviors for the pre-radicalization stage, self-identification and jihadization 
stages of the NYPD model are defined as typical or unremarkable behavior, association 
and network behavior, and operational planning, respectively. These behaviors are 
consistent with the NYPD objective indicators sought to be discovered by that study. 
Table 6 provides the associations.  




Pre-Radicalization Typical behavior 
Self-Identification Association and Network behavior  
Indoctrination Legalistic Interpretation 
Trust Selective Authority 
Schism Between the West and Islam 
Low Tolerance for Deviance 
Proselytizing-advocating force 
Political Radicalization  
Jihadization Operational planning for jihad/Recruitment 
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In applying the staging method to the cases, seven of the cases showed CMC 
usage beginning in the self-identification stage, one in the jihadization stage, and one in 
the indoctrination stage. Of those in the self-identification stage, only Roshonara 
Choudhry showed no overt behaviors. Choudhry’s statement that she used the Internet to 
find information regarding Islam places her in the self-identification stage, but it should 
be noted she proceeded rapidly from pre-radicalization through to jihadist action by 
stabbing UK Parliament Member Stephen Timms.  
The sole indoctrination case involved Betim Kaziu and Sulejah Hadzovic. They 
used the Internet to view videos by Osama bin Laden and then attempted to join al-
Qaeda. Sulejah Hadzovic stated that he and Kaziu wanted to fight jihad due to the 
persecution of Muslims by the U.S., implying the schism between the West and Islam as 
a motivator. By seeking out bin Laden videos, Kaziu displayed a disposition that moved 
beyond finding association and network. He sought information from a well-known 
jihadist source, implying he had trust in him and desired the legalistic view of Islam 
promoted by the source.  
Hamaad Munshi was the only person found to be in the jihadization stage. 
Munshi’s background and contacts established his worldview prior to using CMC. He 
sought information regarding explosives with the intent to become an operational jihadist.  
Table 7.   Case Staging and Behaviors 
Case Name NYPD Stage G-R & G Behavior 
Hamaad Munshi Jihadization Operational Planning 
Roshonara Choudhry Self-identification No overt behavior 
Nicky Reilly Self-identification Association and Network 
Colleen LaRose Self-identification Association and Network 
Mohammed Hassan Khalid Self-identification Association and Network 
Arid Uka aka Abu Reyyan Self-identification Association and Network 
Betim Kaziu and Sulejah 
Hadzovic 
Indoctrination Schism between West and Islam 
Mohamed Osman 
Mohamud 
Self-identification Association and Network 
Abdul Basheer Abdul 
Kader 
Self-identification Schism between West and Islam 
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C. DISCUSSION 
1. Causation and Correlation and Comprehension of Threat 
If Internet radicalization is real, then it is a distinct kind of radicalization with a 
causation path that includes CMC. If it is mere correlation, then radicalization is not 
distinct and only provides a path to radicalization that could be affected through another 
means. To discern this idea, causation must be understood in terms of its meaning in 
systems and processes.  
Philosophers of science have identified causation as important in determining a 
relation between events.167  There is a question whether causation is deterministic or 
merely functionally related. An inductive conclusion that CMC causes radicalization has 
been drawn from the observation that some radicalized individuals used CMC to access 
extremist information, or participate in or join a jihadist network. Concluding that a 
single element drives the outcome from among several elements in the complex process 
of radicalization attributes causation to that single element without verifying whether the 
CMC element actually changed the outcome from the outcome that would have resulted 
had CMC not been involved.168  A particular variable cannot be a cause of an outcome if 
the outcome cannot be proved to have changed by the application of the variable. An 
outcome that results when a variable is present in a process cannot be assumed to be the 
cause of the outcome either. The presence or absence of the variable and the likelihood 
that the outcome will change may present a correlation between the two, but not 
necessarily causation.  
The impact of CMC upon the radicalization process cannot be observed directly 
through experimentation. There is an inherent difficulty in testing for cause in social 
sciences. Experiments cannot be conducted to control for dependent and independent 
variables as in a laboratory. Creating a scenario or experiment to test the effects of an 
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intervention, such as CMC, cannot be accomplished; social science is left with observing 
what has occurred, and finding a logical and scientifically supportable method to 
understand the complex process and attribute causation.169   
Another difficulty in exploring the effect of CMC on radicalization is the fact that 
the radicalization process is not linear. The impact of each variable on the other produces 
a feedback loop supporting or diminishing the drive to radicalize and commit an act of 
terrorism. Conventional communication can drive the desire to use CMC to attain greater 
understanding, and a vulnerability can be exploited, as well as aided with CMC 
information focusing on the root cause. Examples of CMC countering radicalization can 
be found online, as well as CMC instigating radicalization.170  The nature of all 
communication, the impact of all content, and the affect upon vulnerabilities creates a 
complex system that hinders verifying causation since the variables are not clearly 
independent and are adjacent variables.171  Attributing causation to CMC with scientific 
certainty may be impossible. The best that can be derived from this study is that Islamic 
extremists are using CMC and the functionalities of the Internet provide the same 
ubiquitous convenience, access, connectivity, and social impact that others utilize for a 
variety of outcomes. The “demassification” of mass communications through CMC 
constructed to target specific audiences has been acknowledged as a trend that is 
expected to continue.172   The ability to influence people through CMC exists not only in 
jihadi networks and with Islamic extremists, but also with other agenda-driven 
producers.173  
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The proponents of Internet radicalization assert that CMC exists and affects the 
group of radicalizing factors in such a manner as to drive the outcome. This assumption is 
faulty at the outset without having to prove causation to refute it. The outcome and the 
presence of CMC with all of the conventional radicalization factors are being used to 
prove the CMC caused the outcome. Radicalization existed prior to the creation of the 
Internet and CMC; therefore, it can be safely concluded that CMC is not necessary for 
radicalization. Hence, it cannot be a critical component or a necessary component to 
radicalize people in terms of pure logic. Karl Popper’s refutation of induction by finding 
correct errors applies to this example. To determine the validity of a thesis, it is not 
enough to show the existence of data to support the thesis, but to determine what 
evidence would disprove the thesis and whether that evidence can be observed.174  The 
fact that radicalization existed prior to CMC and the fact that radicalization continues 
without CMC weakens the assertion that CMC causes radicalization. Again, all that can 
be determined is the mere correlation that some people that access CMC become radicals 
and that CMC has some value to those that become radicals.  
The issue, however, is whether the addition of CMC to existing radicalization 
factors has such an effect that radicalization is more likely to occur with CMC than 
without it. The dilemma in discerning whether Internet radicalization exists as a threat is 
how to determine whether CMC is the influential variable driving the change from 
conventional worldview to extremist worldview. This logic problem requires 
distinguishing whether the CMC is a controlling variable among the other factors, an 
initiating factor for a sequence of events, or a catalyst. This evaluation falls short of using 
the terminology of causation philosophy, but may suit the purpose in understanding the 
dynamics of the complex radicalization process when CMC is applied.175  Causation 
becomes less relevant, but correlation is important. Correlation can support the 
comprehension of the threat of Internet radicalization if CMC influences the negative 
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outcome—radicalization. Comprehension is regarded in terms of the sense that the 
correlation instills fear, not in the determinate essence of cause and effect.  
Correlation must be evaluated to determine whether the comprehension of the 
threat is warranted. In this thesis, the same outcome—radicalization—is identified for 
processes involving CMC and those not involving CMC. Therefore, structuring a system 
to see whether the correlation between CMC, and the outcome, can help explain the 
significance of CMC in validating the comprehension of the threat of Internet 
radicalization. The relationships between the variables have been evaluated, not for linear 
process of causation, but for impact within the known sequence of events, disposition of 
the individual identified here as vulnerabilities, and the reasonable perceived weight of 
conventional communications in relation to CMC. This framework is outside the 
traditional causation models, but serves a purpose in identifying whether the threat should 
be taken as genuine and probable, or unusual and rare.  
2. Categorization: Internet Radicalization-Support-Utility 
Radicalizing influences outside the cyber-realm exist, but the assumed persuasive 
impact of CMC promotes fear that a unique and powerful path to radicalization has been 
created, which facilitates the metamorphosis quicker, more frequently, and directly. For 
Internet radicalization to be considered valid, CMC does not need to be the sole 
radicalizing agent. CMC can bring about the radical change as a controlling variable, an 
initiating factor, or a catalyst. In all three, CMC facilitates radicalization through linking 
and joining a person to an extremist network or providing persuasive radicalizing content 
to a seeker of knowledge. To support classifying the outcome as Internet radicalization, 
CMC would appear at a significant point in the radicalization process, and provide 
influential information and contacts that the person would not have otherwise had. The 
CMC access correlates with the change. CMC that is not attributed to directly influencing 
radicalization can be categorized as support or utility to radicalized individuals and 
groups.  
An example of support would be a radicalized person who associates with local 
extremists or attends venues where extremist content can be found and supplements those 
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resources with CMC accessed information, virtual contacts, and international political 
and religious conflicts. Utility would be radicalized individuals using CMC in the course 
of jihadist network business and in active recruiting. Utility includes obtaining 
instructional material from a website, arranging meetings, preparing and directing 
operation plans through both synchronous and asynchronous communication methods, 
and participating in recruitment efforts orchestrated by the network members. An 
example of utility would be jihadists creating and lurking in chat rooms or forums to 
identify vulnerable individuals for recruitment. The cases listed as non-Internet 
radicalization cases in the Appendix are included as examples of both support and utility.  
These classifications have value because they enable scholars who study this area 
to distinguish between CMC influences on radicalization from CMC as a ubiquitous 
modern communication tool that extremists use in the same manner as everyone else. 
These classifications are relevant because studying the radicalization connection to CMC 
technology should not be all encompassing under an umbrella of “Internet 
radicalization,” but should focus on the specific components of radicalization and the 
particular impact CMC has on those components. The illusion of an “all-powerful 
Internet” changes from a rhetorical device that clouds reason and confounds analysis to a 
practical communication capability that intervenes, facilitates, or enhances radicalization 
dynamics that exist notwithstanding the existence of new communication technology. 
CMC ubiquity becomes a mechanical fact to contend with, rather than the cause of a 
threat that is still being studied for its root causes.  
3. Specific Analysis with Categories 
a. Internet Radicalization 
Analyzing the selected cases in regard to the variables discloses that the 
cases of Roshonara Choudhry, Colleen LaRose and Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader can be 
categorized as Internet radicalization. Choudhry sought out information about Islam, 
found extremist content, and swiftly acted with violence as an act of jihad. Similarly, 
Basheer led a successful life and after turning to the Internet for answers regarding Islam, 
and sought to wage jihad to attack perceived injustices to Muslims. The lack of 
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information regarding conventional communication for Choudhry and Basheer, and the 
absence of any apparent vulnerability prior to engaging with CMC, makes both cases the 
strongest examples of Internet radicalization in this study. Both express views consistent 
with relative deprivation, but each appears to come to that position after receiving online 
content transmitting the perceived plight of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
duty for jihad to address the injustice. Further study of these cases may provide 
understanding of why Choudhry and Basheer moved from information seeker to jihadist, 
and uncover unknown vulnerabilities or influential conventional communications.  
Information shows that LaRose may have been vulnerable to 
radicalization due to her mental health, but the fact that she is a Muslim convert, the lack 
of evidence of conventional communication with Islamic extremists, and her full use of 
Internet functionalities for instruction, inspiration, propaganda, support and operations, 
provides support to assert that CMC played a greater role in her worldview shift than 
conventional communication. Purveyors of radicalizing CMC content and the existing 
extremist network did, however, exploit her vulnerability, thus supporting some 
justification for fearing the accessibility of radical networks and content through Internet 
functionalities.  
b. Support 
The remaining six cases can be categorized as using CMC and Internet 
functionalities for support. All but two of the cases involved CMC being accessed in the 
self-identification stage. Hamaad Munshi engaged the Internet at the jihadization stage 
and Kaziu and Hadzovic at the indoctrination stage. Hamaad Munshi first began using 
Internet functionalities after his direct contact with Islamic militant Aabid Khan. Khan’s 
influence cannot be absolutely determined, but factoring in the youth vulnerability when 
Munshi encountered him, the conservative family and his direct interest in explosives, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Munshi was radicalized outside of radicalizing CMC 
content, and had already become part of a network.  Kaziu and Hadzovic’s exposure to 
conventional communication regarding Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay likely inspired 
a shift in worldview, which was further supported by CMC content. They did not appear 
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to be information seekers stumbling on extremist views in their search for truth; rather, 
they appeared as enraged Muslims seeking to find ways to address injustice.  
The case of Arid Uka is difficult to discern between Internet radicalization 
and support, but the contact between him and known extremist Rami Makanesi casts 
doubt that radicalization resulted solely or primarily from consumption of Internet 
content. The quick jump into the jihadist cyber-world—four to five weeks before killing 
U.S. servicemen without prior Internet presence—discounts classifying him as a seeker 
of information who found a new way of thinking from the content he encountered. The 
abrupt change seems to imply some catalyst pushing him to make the transition prior to 
appearing on the Internet.  It appears that he jumped in seeking a supporting network. 
Therefore, categorizing the CMC impact and his usage of Internet functionalities as 
support better fits the facts than does Internet radicalization.  
The remaining support cases contain evidence of radicalization prior to 
engaging radical CMC. Nicky Reilly’s behavior after watching 9/11 videos, conversion 
to Islam, and conduct attributed to this family situation, mental health vulnerability and 
conventional communication at a mosque display a worldview shift. The Internet was 
used to feed his interests rather than create his interest. Mohammed Hassan Khalid’s 
youth vulnerability, immigration from Pakistan, conventional communication prior to 
immigration and direct contact with extremist chat rooms tend to imply that he was 
radicalized prior to utilizing CMC. Khalid’s recruitment can be directly attributed to 
CMC functionalities, but radicalization cannot be ascertained directly with the available 
information. Extensive integration within the jihadi cyber networks appears as a practical 
result of radicalization rather than a top-down pull to radicalize; hence, the support 
classification is appropriate. 
Mohamed Osman Mohamud’s contact with the unnamed Pakistani jihadist 
recruiter, which resulted in his efforts to join jihad in Afghanistan rather than Mohamud’s 
Somali homeland, gives support to finding he was radicalized by conventional 
communication rather than radical CMC content. Mohamud authored articles for online 
jihadi publication Jihad Recollections, giving support to a contention that he was 
radicalized prior to establishing a web presence. As a participant in producing and 
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distributing propaganda, Mohamud took advantage of CMC and Internet functionalities 
doing the business of a jihadist. Therefore, his usage is not only for support, but also for 
utility.  
c. Utility 
Utility CMC usage is a catchall category for use that may or may not be 
consequential to a given goal, and is not distinguished from common usage employed by 
typical Internet users such as email communication. Some of the cases summarized in the 
Appendix provide broad examples of utility use. The fact that the cases were not 
analyzed completely under the thesis framework or through a rigorous review of the facts 
leaves the possibility that more information and study may disclose correlation to 
radicalization of the subjects. The cases have value to this thesis as illustration of the 
broad net that encompasses allusion of power given to Internet technology. 
Sixteen of the twenty-five cases reviewed for inclusion in this study have 
been used as examples of the danger of the Internet in radicalization and recruitment. 
Eight cases were excluded from thesis analysis as either clearly resulting from 
conventional radicalization or due to insufficient evidence. The subjects’ use of CMC in 
some way instigated writers to find that the cases were illustrations of the connection of 
Internet use and terrorism, or associated with the fear of Internet radicalization. The mere 
presence of Internet communication may not distinguish these cases as anything more 
than individuals using the Internet in the same manner as everyone else—utility usage.  
Five of the sixteen cases involve groups of individuals planning or 
executing terror attacks, or joining jihad in a foreign nation. These cases were excluded 
from the thesis study because of the multiple members involved, but application of the 
framework to individual participants may determine what drove individual radicalization. 
In each case, CMC was alleged to have been used to further group goals. Individuals in 
these cases used CMC to communicate with each other and Islamic extremist networks. 
Three of the sixteen cases involve radicalized individuals using CMC and Internet 
functionalities to recruit new members to extremist networks or inspiring others to violent 
jihad. These three cases illustrate how utility use of CMC can further the goals of jihadi 
 56
operatives. As providers of content and tools of recruitment, the three operational cases 
support fear of communication technology due to the impact the few can have on many.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The research question is whether radicalizing content provided through computer-
mediated communication (CMC) creates a distinct threat of radicalization referred to as 
Internet radicalization. To answer this question, an analysis framework was constructed 
to review the radicalization causation elements and radicalization stages, and discern 
between computer-mediated and conventional communication types. The framework 
involved analyzing each case in terms of conventional communication, CMC and 
vulnerabilities that are defined with social psychology categories used to study 
radicalization. The analysis was further reviewed with radicalization stages as identified 
by staging behaviors. The framework provided a method to compare variables to each 
other and to a relative timeline to see first whether radicalization could be attributed 
outside of CMC, then to determine whether conventional communication or 
circumstances created a greater pressure to radicalize by weight of influence or sequence 
of contact or events. The framework provides a process of elimination for Internet 
radicalization rather than an absolute confirmation. Attributing radicalization to the 
Internet remains when other factors are excluded; however, due to incomplete evidence 
in the cases and the limits on methods in social science to determine causation, asserting 
an absolute cause is neither prudent nor supportable. The findings can merely state there 
are circumstances in some cases where a correlation can be found among the variables to 
attribute CMC to radicalization—identified as Internet radicalization. Since some 
circumstances involving CMC may increase the likelihood of radicalization, the fear of 
Internet radicalization may be reasonable. The number of incidents that validate that fear, 
however, make the threat unlikely and appear more as a phantom menace than a real 
threat. 
This thesis examined twenty-five cases that popular opinion promotes as 
examples of Internet radicalization, or the radicalization threat that is produced by the 
power of Internet functionalities and CMC. Of these cases, sixteen were reviewed and 
excluded as Internet radicalization cases, either because radicalization can be clearly 
attributed to conventional communications or another cause, or that Internet 
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functionalities were used as a communication utility in the same manner that others may 
use the same capabilities. Of the nine cases remaining, three were found with variable 
correlations likely to establish radicalization caused by or attributed to CMC and six were 
found to have sufficient evidence to exclude CMC as causing radicalization. The analysis 
found that in the six non-Internet radicalization cases radicalization likely developed 
prior to using Internet functionalities and that Internet use supported and promoted the 
radical agenda, but was not a significant cause of radicalization.  
The fact that three cases withstood the framework analysis makes it possible that 
Internet radicalization may exist, but other factors previously studied and affecting 
radicalization most likely have a greater impact on radicalization. Globalization is 
enhanced by the Internet, and brings distant conflicts to geographic locations where the 
conflict would not matter much. Information from the conflict can inspire group 
identification and instigate relative deprivation where ignorance would not.176 177 
Therefore, CMC may merely provide an audience rather than a cause.  
Roshonara Choudhry and Abdul Basheer Abdul Kader present the best examples 
of Internet radicalization. In each case, however, self-identification with their Islamic 
roots led to discovery of group conflicts they could identify with and act upon. 
Discovering their “muse” for jihad may not have occurred but for the Internet, but the 
root cause for their consternation and motivation actually exists—notwithstanding 
whether information is delivered to them by cyber means, television news, or mosque 
sermons. Radicalization through CMC may just be a modern derivative of traditional 
radicalization, but not distinct. The new technology may expand information flow and 
radical messages to a larger audience in a more influential manner, but the circumstances 
creating the news and forming the messages that change worldviews have not. The 
connection of new technology to the efficacy of broadly communicated radicalizing 
information and access to extremist networks only distinguishes Internet radicalization as 
a modern, convenient route for traditional radicalization rather than a new form of 
radicalization.  
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Colleen LaRose’s case supports the theory of distinct Internet radicalization, but 
unlike Choudhry and Basheer, LaRose’s vulnerability from personal problems and 
mental state more than likely drove her radicalization. The root cause stemming from her 
troubled psyche created susceptibility to radicalization. Radical CMC content and the 
jihadi network she joined provided an opportunity to develop interpersonal relationships 
building inclusion and value.178   
This thesis has shown that a significant correlation between CMC and 
radicalization may exist to create incidents of Internet radicalization, but that the hype 
about it being pervasive is probably overstated. The number of cases that were reviewed 
reduced numerous allusions of Internet radicalization down to three likely cases where 
the CMC may have developed jihadists. The Internet is an efficient conduit of 
information and a linkage tool connecting like-minded people. Absent root causes 
creating vulnerability, however, the threat of Internet radicalization might only be the fear 
that someone—who we should already fear—turns the light switch on to enlighten 
themselves, or find partners who, until illuminated, were merely ghosts in the dark. The 
menace is in the phantoms we choose not to see, rather than the illumination that 
discloses the root cause issues that create the terror threat.  
A. WHY THIS MATTERS AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NEXT 
The perception that Internet radicalization is an actual threat makes determining 
whether the threat is real, illusory or derivative important. If Internet radicalization does 
not exist, then efforts to counter extremist CMC or networking capabilities may be an 
unnecessary battle. Spending energy, money and time to formulate policy, strategies and 
tactics to counter the phantom threat diverts resources that may be better utilized 
addressing root causes. If the threat is illusory, then understanding the attribution of 
mystical power to Internet technology should be addressed through further study and 
strategies. Correcting misimpressions of enhanced efficacy through technological 
                                                 
178 Deborah Leiter and John Dowd, “Textual Expectations, (Dis)Embodiment, and Social Presence in 
CMC,” in Interpersonal Relations and Social Patterns in Communication Technologies: Discourse Norms, 
Language Structures and Cultural Variables, ed. Jung-ran Park and Eileen Abels (Vancouver, IG Global, 
2010), 32-47, doi: 10.4018/978-1-61520-827-2.ch003. 
 60
advances can relieve the fear created by illusory power. Similarly, the fear of the CMC 
threat may be exaggerated by perceived impact on others. For example, a study 
determined that people perceived the negative impact of Internet pornography on others 
is greater than the perceived impact on themselves.179  The same kind of projected threat 
and vulnerability may be applied to radical CMC. Therefore, the perceived fear of the 
radicalizing material could be studied to avoid policy decisions that address unfounded 
risks or misidentified vulnerabilities.  
If Internet radicalization is derivative of typical radicalization such that it 
facilitates or accelerates radicalization, but does not cause it, then the proper attention 
should be given to address the root causes rather than the communication tool. Attacking 
the content and the ability to publish and transmit the content has U.S. Constitution First 
Amendment legal ramifications that are better avoided if radicalization can be address at 
its actual cause. 180   
National strategies identify radicalization through the Internet as a concern. 181 182 
In August 2011, the White House issued a strategy to prevent violent extremism in the 
U.S.183 and a strategy implementation plan in December 2011.184  The White House 
strategy identifies countering online violent extremist propaganda as a priority185 and the 
implementation plan commits the government to research and expand violent 
radicalization analysis into the role of the Internet and how to use the cyber realm for 
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countermeasures.186  As a component of the plan, the actual impact of CMC on 
radicalization must be studied in depth to separate the myth from reality. Merely asserting 
that the threat exists and building policies upon unsubstantiated belief can cost time and 
money that can be used to address the external, social, and individual causes of 
radicalization.187 Marc Sageman summed up the approach that needs to be taken to 
address radicalization:  
A successful strategy will disrupt the process of radicalization before it 
reaches its violent end.188 It is indeed a contest for the hearts and minds of 
potential terrorists, not an intellectual debate about the legitimacy of an 
extreme interpretation of a religious message.189  The Internet should 
become the battleground of this war of interpretation, hopes, dreams, and 
aspirations.190 
This thesis has provided an analytical framework synthesizing sociological 
radicalization causation elements, psychological and social-psychological vulnerabilities, 
practical staging categorizations, and communication components. The fusion provided 
groupings into variables that could be examined in relation to each other to understand 
correlations and interactions. Future research can apply the same method to evaluate and 
synthesize the different disciplinary approaches employed by the social sciences to 
understand the impact of communication technology upon radicalization causes and 
interpretation of social conditions. Melding cross-disciplinary components to construct 
hybrid categories that can be evaluated within each discipline enables developing new 
perspectives and understanding. For example, in this thesis combining practical staging 
elements with objective behaviors in psychology provided insight that was absent in each 
independently.  
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Further research needs to be undertaken to understand susceptibility to 
radicalization and the whether chance encounters facilitated by new communications 
technologies increase significant life changes.191  Deconstructing vulnerability to 
distinguish between gullibility, susceptibility, and impaired discernment should be 
explored to further understand the impact of unconventional thought. One of the fears of 
the Internet is the impact of unintended reception of objectionable content or interaction 
with predators. Search engines such as Google, Bing and Yahoo facilitate targeted 
searches for information, but inadvertently encountering harmful material is a possibility. 
Therefore, understanding correlations between vulnerability and chance encounters may 
help determine whether the risk of life change is substantial or questionable.  
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APPENDIX. CASES FREQUENTLY CITED AS EXAMPLES OF 
INTERNET RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT, BUT CMC 
IS USED FOR UTILITY OR SUPPORT RATHER THAN FOR 
INTERNET RADICALIZATION  
The cases summarized in this Appendix are frequently cited as examples of the 
threat that the Internet plays in terrorism, radicalization and recruitment. The cases were 
excluded from thesis analysis because they involved numerous people; the principal 
individuals were obviously radicalized prior to utilizing CMC, or the radical operatives 
utilized the Internet to further an existing extremist agenda. The cases are separated into 
three categories to simplify review:  cases involving groups, operative cases, clearly 
conventional radicalization cases, and insufficient information cases. 
A. CASES INVOLVING GROUPS  
1. London Transportation Bomb Plot of July 21, 2005 
Four African men were arrested for attempting to bomb the London 
Transportation system on July 21, 2005. Al Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf directly 
recruited the four men—Muktar Said Ibrahim, Yassin Omar, Ramzi Mohammed and 
Hussain Osman. 192  Ibrahim was the leader of the group and the only one of the men to 
travel to Pakistan for terror training. Three articles use this case as an example of the 
Internet radicalization threat.193  The articles point out that plotter Hussein Osman told 
investigators that he and his group regularly watched Internet videos about Iraq and used 
the Internet to learn about jihad. Osman was said to have stated that his group would 
watch films, “especially those in which you saw women and children killed and 
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exterminated by the English and American soldiers, or widows, mothers and daughters 
who were crying.”194  The extremist multi-media content was delivered by Internet 
websites. The content displaying the plight of Iraqi Muslims may have instilled a 
perceived injustice resulting in relative deprivation. The fact that the men attended the 
Finsbury Park Mosque where radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri preached has significant 
weight in determining whether the Internet would have caused their radicalization. 
Radicalization likely preceded CMC usage. CMC played both a support and utility role in 
this case. Support in confirming the radical ideas promoted at the mosque and utility in 
providing communication capabilities between the conspirators.  
2. Canadian Bomb Plot aka Toronto 18 Plot 
A group of Muslim men planned to explode trucks at various locations in 
downtown Toronto.195  Three sources cite this case as an example of Internet 
radicalization.196  Plotting started in chat rooms in 2004.197  Fourteen adults and four 
youths were arrested. Two Americans from Atlanta, Georgia, contacted the Toronto 
group by chat and email and travelled to Toronto in March 2005 to meet them.198  The 
Toronto group also established communication links to the Aabid Khan jihadi group in 
London through email and chat rooms.199  Internet functionalities were used for 
education and interaction with others with similar viewpoints. The group had contact 
with each other through elementary school and supported each other in the slide to 
extremism before they used CMC. The group used Internet chat rooms, email, forums, 
website videos and web-provided training material. Fahim Ahmad led and influenced the 
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Toronto group through direct contact and provided the group al-Awlaki jihadi videos on a 
laptop.200  Information regarding the overseas Muslim situation was received from a 
combination of experience, verbal communication and through CMC. The known facts 
make attributing radicalization to external, internal and individual factors reasonable. 
Psychiatric reports about Zakaria Amara, who converted from Orthodox Christian to 
Islam around the time he turned ten years old, show that his conversion may have been a 
result of reactive opposition to his strained family life.201  Relative deprivation appears to 
motivate the group to action. Attributing radicalization to CMC is not possible in this 
case. The group used CMC extensively to further their plans and interact with an 
international network as a utility and used the content for support, but the impetus for 
radicalizing cannot be distinguished between conventional contact and CMC.  
3. Shirwa Ahmed and Somali Youth Radicalization 
Shirwa Ahmed was a naturalized Somali who left the U.S. to become the first 
U.S. resident suicide bomber on October 29, 2008.202  It is thought that he radicalized 
within the U.S. and that the Internet facilitated his change. Friends noticed he started to 
become more religious as early as 2002.203  Bruce Hoffman and FBI Director Robert S. 
Mueller III define his case as homegrown terror recruitment.204  The high unemployment 
and tough integration into the U.S. culture have been attributed to the Somali 
radicalization. These root causes have been identified in European diaspora communities, 
but were not found in the U.S. until the Somali youth radicalization.205  The 
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radicalization of Shirwa Ahmed and the other Somali youths was likely instigated by a 
handful of men who arrived in Minneapolis in late 2007 after traveling to Somalia to 
fight with the Islamist movement there.206  Al Shabab released videos portraying 
Somalia’s struggle to defend Islam and establish an Islamic state. Many of the Somali 
youth viewed violent videos in a youth center computer lab.207  These videos, received 
through the Internet, enflamed the Somali youth who had viewed their homeland’s 
problems as a fight against the Ethiopian enemy occupation.208   The external threat 
established a group identity that the youths could join. Group identification dynamics 
likely drove radicalization with relative deprivation denying the group justice. CMC 
brought radicalizing political and religious information to them to validate their change to 
jihadists. Another Somali youth, Mohamoud Hassan, became more religious and 
interested in the Somali homeland; in 2007, he began downloading sermons onto his iPod 
and searching the Internet for jihadist videos, chat rooms and sermons by Anwar al-
Awlaki.209  Despite the Internet functionalities accessed for information, individuals at 
the Abubakar mosque and an older adult who purchased airline tickets for the youths had 
personal contact with them and were likely more persuasive in changing their worldview 
than the videos alone. Context for the Ethiopian-Somali conflict provided by the local 
religious leaders enhanced whatever impact the Internet videos and sermons provided. To 
be noted, the inspiration for radicalization seems tied to the rape of Somali women.  
4. Ramy Zamzam Group 
A group of five men in their twenties—Waqar Hussain Khan, Omar Farooq, 
Ahmed Abdullah Minni, Ramy S. Zamzam and Iman Hassan Yemer—traveled from the 
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United States to Pakistan to fight jihad against U.S. troops in Afghanistan.210  Two are of 
Pakistani origin, one Egyptian, one is of Ethiopian descent and another is of Eritrean 
background. Zamzam is the son of Egyptian Muslim immigrants from a not especially 
religious family. The neighborhood mosque the group attended had a club atmosphere for 
the youths.211  It is uncertain whether the five displayed any outward signs of 
radicalization. The only item that gave such indication is Zamzam’s farewell message 
video referencing world events, and that that Muslims must do something about evidence 
of relative deprivation.212    
The group frequently watched YouTube videos and left comments praising 
Taliban attacks. Active participation within the virtual communities distinguished the 
individuals, and their comments caught the attention of a Pakistani militant who recruited 
them to come to Pakistan. The group made contact with al Qaeda affiliates through the 
Internet and used email to leave coded messages.213 All are Muslims in this case illustrate 
a top-down recruitment of radical individuals who are identified by Internet use. 
Radicalization is unclear in this case. CMC is used to obtain information and participate 
in virtual communities. Why the individuals radicalized is not evident, and attributing 
CMC as the primary radicalizing agent without further information cannot be 
substantiated. All have been convicted in Pakistan for terror-related charges.  
5. Madrid Bombing 
The March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings were perpetrated by an al-Qaeda-
inspired group intending to use the bombings to influence the upcoming elections in 
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Spain and force Spain to withdraw from Iraq. Dr. Fernando Reinares214 and Akil 
Awan215 have attributed the Internet to be a tool used in conjunction with face-to-face 
interaction as instrumental in the Madrid bombing case. The attribution of Internet 
radicalization to this case is limited. Terror groups utilized Internet websites to present 
information to encourage bombing trains to compel Spain to withdraw from Iraq. CMC 
was used to motivate action to change an external circumstance. The worldview of the 
target audience appears to be assumed, and the utility is to motivate and perhaps recruit 
action by radicalized Muslims rather than inspire individual worldview change. CMC 
was provided to those with a predisposition to extremism.  
B. OPERATIVE CASES 
1. Aabid Hussein Khan: 
Aabid Hussein Khan founded a terrorist cell at the age of twenty-two. Khan has 
been presented as an example of self-radicalization because he sought out and consumed 
mujahedeen and jihadist information available on the Internet as early as age twelve.216   
He became a critical node in an extremist network with members in the UK, U.S. and 
Canada.217  Khan actively recruited young people to join the jihadi movement and 
arranged travel to Pakistan for terrorist training.218  Khan met and likely influenced 
Hamaad Munshi at a mosque in Drewsbury, UK. Khan admitted to being an orthodox 
Muslim with strong religious beliefs. His travel to Pakistan as a pre-teen and teenager 
may have influenced his following violent jihad.219  When viewing Internet-accessible 
material, Khan stated, “I felt upset and angry at the onslaught against innocent women 
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and children by countries such as Russia.” 220 This statement frames his radicalization 
within relative deprivation theory. His age might provide dispositional susceptibility to 
radical persuasion. The claim that he is self-radicalized is a stretch since his contacts in 
Pakistan at an early age and contact with extremist views at the Drewsbury mosque does 
not isolate him. The jihadist ideology surrounded him. Had he been a Christian without 
real-life Muslim connections, an argument for self-radicalization might be more 
persuasive. Here it is not. The impact of the radicalizing Internet content may make this a 
case for Internet radicalization if the other Islamic contact is completely moderate. Aabid 
Khan can justifiably be called an important contributor to the violent jihadi web presence 
and attributed with having an impact on those viewing the material, but asserting him as 
an example of Internet radicalization is not supported.  
2. Younes Tsouli aka Irhabi007: 
Younes Tsouli, along with Waseem Mughal and Tariq Al-Daour, operated 
websites and online forums and created and posted online literature and videos in support 
of jihad.221  In early 2004, Tsouli joined a number of popular web forums and quickly 
became known by his cyber name of Irhabi007. Tsouli’s work included downloading 
videos, posting email messages, and chatting on web forums. He did not have prior 
involvement in extremist groups, but as a result of his Internet activities, he was joined by 
“others online to create a ‘virtual’ terrorist cell.”222  Tsouli’s Internet activities were the 
result of his existing extremist worldview. It cannot be said that the Internet caused his 
worldview to change. His computer expertise was used by al Qaeda and is an example of 
implementing al Qaeda’s Internet communication strategy. He is a good illustration of 
exploiting CMC capabilities to radicalize and recruit.  
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3. Jesse Curtis Morton aka Younis Abdullah Muhammed 
Morton is a Muslim convert committed to follow the teachings of radical Muslim 
cleric Sheikh Abdullah Faisal.223  He founded Revolution Muslim website in December 
2007 and published radical content encouraging violent jihad by terrorizing disbelievers 
of Islam.224 225 Morton also advocated violence against South Park cartoon creators for 
creating an episode with the prophet Muhammad in a bear suit. He was arrested and pled 
guilty to making threats against the South Park creators. Morton worked with Zachary 
Chesser in posting the online threats to the South Park creators. His site also published 
the al-Qaeda Inspire magazine and called for violence against the cartoonist who 
proposed an “Everybody Draw Muhammad Day.”  Investigation reveals insufficient 
information to determine his progress to radicalization. The impact of his website, 
however, is the kind of information that is objected to as radicalizing.  
C. CLEARLY CONVENTIONAL RADICALIZATION CASES 
1. Rajim Karim 
Rajim Karim is a British Airways employee who used his position to pass on 
sensitive information to Islamist extremists and planned on finding a way to crash British 
Airways computer systems to cause chaos to international travel.226  He made contact 
with Anwar al-Awlaki via the Internet. Karim is Bangladeshi, upper class and college 
educated. Karim was radicalized with his brother, Tehzeeb. The brothers supported 
Jammat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, an organization that desires to establish an Islamic 
state.227 Support for Jammat-ul-Mujahideen implies their radical views existed 
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independent of the Internet usage. It appears their extremist worldview drove them to 
seek out personal contact with al-Awlaki. Tehzeeb traveled to Yemen and made direct 
contact with al-Awlaki. Rajim moved from Bangladesh to the UK for health care for his 
child. To the public, Rajim painted himself as a liberal Muslim rather than an Islamist.228  
Rajim contacted al-Awlaki through email and likely viewed online video sermons of al-
Awlaki. Terrorism planning between al-Awlaki and Tehzeeb was accomplished via 
email. The brothers’ association with Jammat-ul-Mujahideen in Bangladesh leads to a 
reasonable conclusion that radicalization came as a result of personal experience with the 
external political dynamics in Bangladesh rather than through CMC.  
2. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
Nigerian Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an explosive device sown into his 
underwear on an airplane headed to Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day 2009. He is 
commonly referred to as the “Underwear Bomber.”  Prior to this incident, he was known 
to be a devout Muslim, and classmates at his boarding school referred to him as 
“Pope.”229  He posted numerous messages online on an Islamic Forum website under the 
name of “farouk1986.”230  As early as 2005, Abdulmutallab posted information 
describing inner conflict between his desires, his family relationships, and his devotion to 
Islam. 231  He attended school in the UK where he was the president of the University 
College London’s Islamic Society. While in that position, he employed speakers who 
preached radical messages. It is believed he was radicalized while in London.232   
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Abdulmutallab’s history shows his personal contact in London, Yemen and Nigeria likely 
influenced his worldview. Therefore, his case cannot be considered Internet 
radicalization.  
3. Carlos Bledsoe aka Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad 
This case does not have factors that would tend to show Internet radicalization, 
but does illustrate a homegrown jihadist threat. In a psychiatrist’s evaluation after his 
arrest, Bledsoe stated that he smoked cannabis and drank alcohol to intoxication during 
his teens and early college years, and was a gang member.233  Bledsoe explored Judaism 
before converting to Islam at a Memphis mosque in 2004. He changed his name to 
Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad in 2007, and in the same year traveled to Yemen to 
learn more about Islam.234  The Internet, however, did not play a large part in his 
conversion to Islam nor to his change to a jihadist.235 While in Yemen, he was 
imprisoned, and the experience there likely contributed to his radicalization.  
4. Faisal Shahzad 
Pakistani immigrant Faisal Shahzad, naturalized to U.S. citizenship on April 17, 
2009, attempted to detonate an explosive-laden SUV in the middle of New York City’s 
Times Square on May 1, 2010. Musa and Bendett cite his case as an example of where 
radicalization occurred without an enabling leader and was likely is the result of the 
information he received on the Internet.236  This conclusion is not supported by 
information obtained about Shahzad’s background. Shahzad lived in Pakistan during the 
state-sponsored jihad against India over the Kashmir region and studied in a school 
located on a military base that taught a curriculum with an anti-Western slant and strict 
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Islamic studies.237 While watching the 9/11 attacks, he was reported to state to a friend, 
“They had it coming,” referring to the U.S.238  After he married and his wife became 
pregnant, Shahzad became more religious and expressed anger toward President George 
W. Bush and the war in Iraq.239  He also began to espouse the views of puritanical 
fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Taymyyah, and founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, Abdul Ala 
Mawdudi240. Shahzad received bomb-making training in North Waziristan in 2009 and 
met with Pakistani Taliban there. An email from Shahzad to friends, dated February 25, 
2006, displays Shahzad’s frustration with his perceived injustice to Muslims, his distaste 
for human laws and governments, and concern for the Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Chechnya.241  The worldview developed by Shahzad appears to have resulted from his 
exposure to extremist Islam early in his life and filtering world events through that 
framework. Claiming that he was radicalized through the Internet is an overstatement and 
the fact that he stated he was inspired by al-Awlaki’s writings is used to support 
arguments about the influence of al-Awlaki and the ability of extremists to contact 
Muslims within the United States rather than the radicalization of Shahzad.242  The 
actions by the Pakistani government in connection with the Times Square case support 
the contention that Shahzad worked directly with the Pakistani Taliban and Jaish-e-
Muhammad, and even met with one in the U.S. two months prior to the attack.243 244  
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5. Nidal Hasan 
On November 5, 2009, U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan opened fire 
with two handguns on Fort Hood, killing thirteen people and wounded twenty-nine 
others. The press and others have focused attention on the fact that Hasan communicated 
with Anwar al-Awlaki by email and questions have arisen whether he was self-
radicalized through use of this Internet.245 246  Hasan’s radicalization has also been 
attributed to three major factors in his life: the death of his mother in 2001, movement 
toward conservative Islam after her death, and his close professional contact with soldiers 
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan where he heard stories about the war.247  After his 
mother’s death, Hasan attended the Dar al-Hijrah mosque when Anwar al-Awlaki was the 
imam. What contact Hasan had with al-Awlaki during his attendance at Dar al-Hijrah is 
not known. Co-workers observed Hasan’s extremist views as early as 2003.248  Hasan’s 
required medical residency presentations included material openly questioning whether 
the army should allow Muslims to be conscientious objectors. One presentation from 
June 2007, “The Koranic World View As It Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military,” 
included slides pointing out, “It’s getting harder and harder for Muslims in the service to 
morally justify being in a military that seems constantly engaged against fellow 
Muslims.”249  The presentation further provided information about Islam, quoting the 
Quran, and provides evidence of Hasan’s conservative, if not extremist, leanings prior to 
Internet contact with al-Awlaki. The Internet contact between Hasan and al-Awlaki 
started when Hasan visited Anwar al-Awlaki’s website on December 17, 2008, and sent a 
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message. He followed up with at least fifteen more messages with the final message to al-
Awlaki on June 16, 2009.250  Hasan’s radicalization, while it can be classified as 
homegrown since there is no record of him leaving the country, should not be 
characterized as “Internet radicalization” despite his seeking counsel from al-Awlaki. His 
extremist worldview does not appear to originate from CMC, but from his life situation 
and existing devout beliefs. The information found nothing to indicate that al-Awlaki 
recruited or directed specific actions of Hasan, but only inspirational information 
consistent with the viewpoint already held by Hasan.  
D. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION CASES 
1. Abdul Benbrika 
The Australian Benbrika group downloaded, collated and distributed extremist 
material, including videos of hostage beheadings and documents entitled The Terrorist’s 
Handbook and White Resistance Manual that contained recipes for the manufacture of 
explosives. This case does not fit the radicalization criteria. Nothing can be found in the 
research documents to disclose when Benbrika was radicalized. The World Almanac of 
Islamism reports:   
Benbrika himself, however, appears to have had no sustained contact with 
global terrorist organizations. The only encounter on the public record was 
in 1994, when the British-based al-Qaeda sheikh Abu Qatadah visited 
Australia as a guest of the Melbourne-based Salafi imam Mohamed 
Omran. News reports suggest Benbrika’s radicalization can be traced to 
his exposure to Abu Qatadah’s speeches during that tour.251 
The fact that Benbrika’s group utilized the Internet to obtain extremist material 
and broadcast it through CMC does not offer enough information to attribute CMC to 
radicalization. CMC is used as a tool to further the group’s goals, giving support and 
implemented as a utility.  
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2. Naser Jason Abdo 
A federal jury convicted Naser Jason Abdo of one count of attempted use of a 
weapon of mass destruction; one count of attempted murder of officers or employees of 
the United States; two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime 
of violence; and two counts of possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a 
federal crime of violence for a July 2011 bomb plot in Killeen, Texas.252  Abdo planned 
to blow up a local restaurant where military personnel frequently met. Other than the fact 
that he was found with a copy of “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” 
from the Inspire web magazine, there is nothing found that can attribute his radicalization 
to CMC. Reports disclose that he found the U.S. military action that was killing Muslims 
objectionable and that the proper response is for Muslims everywhere to do what they 
could to stop the killing. This external condition and in-group/out-group dynamics may 
be implied in this radicalization scheme.  
3. Emerson Begolly 
American-born Pennsylvania State University student Begolly, aka Asadullah 
Alshishani, is a Nazi buff turned jihadi. He is a Muslim convert, and there are thoughts 
that Internet content radicalized him.253  Begolly frequently posted on the Internet in the 
Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum. The posts show him to hold radical Islamist beliefs. 
His Nazi beliefs were said to be inspired by his father.254  Begolly’s mother states that he 
suffers from Asperger's syndrome,255 and his lawyer also claims he has Attention Deficit 
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Hyperactivity Disorder, but there is no evidence of a major mental illness.256  He bit two 
FBI agents and was reaching for a loaded pistol as he was arrested on January 4, 2012. 
Other than the Nazi association, there is very little information regarding his 
radicalization.  
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